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PLANNING FOR PARTNERSHIP LIABILITY ALLOCATIONS,
INCLUDING THE NEW PROPOSED REGULATIONS
By
Blake D. Rubin, Andrea M. Whiteway and Jon G. Finkelstein2
McDermott Will & Eme1y LLP, Washington, D.C.
January 2014
I.

INTRODUCTION
A.

The allocation of partnership liabilities can be critical to effectuating the tax
planning goals of a partner.

B.

A partner's basis in a partnership interest generally includes the partner's
allocable share of partnership liabilities. A partner's basis in the partnership
interest is of great importance for two principal reasons.

C.

First, a partner recognizes gain upon a distribution of cash from a partnership only
to the extent the distribution exceeds the partner's basis in the partnership interest.
Section 731(a)(1). 3 On the other side of the coin, a partner may receive
distributions of cash up to the amount of the pminer' s basis in the partnership
interest without recognizing taxable gain.

D.

Second, a partner may deduct losses of the partnership only to the extent of the
partner's basis in the partnership interest. Section 704(d).

E.

Accordingly, a partner's allocation of partnership liabilities is important in
determining the extent to which the partner can receive tax-free distributions of
cash and deduct losses of the pminership.

F.

In addition, a decrease in a partner's share ofliabilities causes the partner to
recognize taxable gain to the extent such decrease exceeds the partner's basis in
the partnership. Section 752(b); Section 731(a). Such a deemed cash distribution
could occur, for example, if a partnership reduces a liability, or if another partner
guarantees a partnership liability. Thus, it is impmiant for a partner to know how
partnership liabilities are allocated for Federal income tax purposes and how to
achieve an allocation that is beneficial to that partner.

2
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Unless otherwise noted or clear from context, section references are to the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.

II.

G.

Part II of this outline summarizes the mles for allocating partnership liabilities for
Federal income tax purposes under the existing section 752 regulations and
contains a series of examples that illustrate techniques for managing the allocation
of patinership liabilities under these mles. In addition, this section explains how
these mles and techniques apply to limited liability companies ("LLC") that are
treated as partnerships for Federal income tax purposes.

H.

Part III of this outline summarizes and analyzes the proposed patinership liability
regulations under section 752 that were issued on January 29, 2014. As noted
below, the proposed regulations would significantly change the way partnership
liabilities are allocated to partners and would, in many cases, trigger gain to
partners that have negative tax basis capital accounts or limit the ability of
partners to take losses into account.

PLANNING UNDER THE EXISTING PARTNERSHIP LIABILITY
ALLOCATION RULES
A.

ALLOCATION OF PARTNERSHIP LIABILITIES: GENERAL RULES
1.

2.

Increase in Share ofLiabilities
a.

Under section 752(a), any increase in a partner's share of liabilities
of a partnership, or any increase in a partner's individual liabilities
by reason of the assumption by such partner of partnership
liabilities, is treated as a contribution of money by such partner to
the partnership.

b.

Under section 722, this deemed contribution of money by the
partner to the partnership increases the partner's basis in the
partnership interest.

Decrease in Share ofLiabilities
a.

Under section 752(b), any decrease in a partner's share of the
liabilities of a partnership, or any decrease in a patiner's individual
liabilities by reason of the assumption by the partnership of such
individual liabilities, is treated as a distribution of money to the
partner by the partnership. Under sections 733(1) and 705(a)(2),
this deemed distribution of money by the partnership to the partner
reduces the partner's basis in the partnership interest, but not
below zero.

4

An LLC is taxable as a partnership for Federal income tax purposes unless it elects to be
taxed as a corporation under the "check-the-box" regulations. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(b)(l).

2

b.

3.

Increases and Decreases in Single Transaction
a.

4.

Under section 731(a), upon a distribution of money to a partner by
a partnership (including a deemed distribution of money pursuant
to Section 752(b)), gain is recognized by the distributee partner to
the extent that the money distributed exceeds the adjusted basis of
the partner's interest immediately before the distribution.

Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(f) provides that if, as a result of a single
transaction, a partner incurs both an increase in the partner's share
of partnership liabilities (or the partner's individual liabilities) and
a decrease in the partner's share of partnership liabilities (or the
partner's individual liabilities), only the net decrease is treated as a
distribution of money and only the net increase is treated as a
contribution of money.

Definition of"Liability" for Purposes of Section 752
a.

Section 752 does not define the term "liability." Until2005, the
regulations under section 752 likewise did not define the term.

b.

In Rev. Rul. 88-77, 1988-2 CB 128, the Internal Revenue Service
(the "Service") held that, for purposes of section 752, the terms
"liabilities of a partnership" and "partnership liabilities" include an
obligation only if and to the extent that incurring the liability
creates or increases the basis to the partnership of any of the
partnership's assets (including cash attributable to borrowings),
gives rise to an immediate deduction to the partnership, or, under
section 705(a)(2)(B), currently decreases a partner's basis in the
partner's partnership interest.

c.

Based on this analysis, the Service concluded that accrued but
unpaid expenses and accounts payable are not liabilities within the
meaning of section 752 for purposes of computing the adjusted
basis of a partner's interest in a partnership using the cash method
of accounting.

d.

In Rev. Rul. 95-26, 1995-1 CB 131, the Service held that a short
sale of securities creates a partnership liability for purposes of
section 752 because the short sale creates an obligation to deliver
the securities while the cash proceeds from the sale increase the
basis of the partnership's assets. See also Salina Partnership v.
Commissioner, 80 T.C.M. (CCH) 686 (2000).

e.

2005 Regulations. In 2005, as part of the amendments to the
section 752 regulations addressing non-tax basis liabilities
discussed in Part IV hereof, Treas. Reg. 1.752-1 was amended to
provide a definition of "liability" for purposes of section 752.
3

Treas. Reg. 1.752-l(a)(4) now provides that an obligation is a
liability if and to the extent that incuning the obligation -1.

ii.
111.

£

5.

6.

creates or increases the basis of any ofthe obligor's assets
(including cash);
gives rise to an immediate deduction to the obligor; or
gives rise to an expense that is not deductible in computing
the obligor's taxable income and is not properly chargeable
to capital.
An "obligation" is any fixed or contingent obligation to make
payment without regard to whether the obligation is otherwise
taken into account for purposes of the Code. Obligations include,
but are not limited to, debt obligations, environmental obligations,
tort obligations, contract obligations, pension obligations,
obligations under a short sale, and obligations under derivative
financial instruments such as options, fmward contracts, and
futures contracts. Thus, an "obligation" the incunence of which
creates or increases basis, give rise to an immediate deduction or
gives rise to a non-deductible, non-capitalizable expense is treated
as a liability.

Recourse Liabilities and Nomecourse Liabilities
a.

Partnership liabilities are classified as either recourse or
nomecourse, and this classification determines the allocation rules
that apply.

b.

If one or more partners bears the "economic risk ofloss" (see
below) with respect to part, but not all, of a partnership liability
represented by a single contractual obligation, that liability is
treated as two or more separate liabilities for purposes of section
752. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-l(h).

Partner's Share ofPartnership Recourse Liabilities
a.

In General. A partnership liability is a recourse liability to the
extent that any partner or related person bears the "economic risk
ofloss" for that liability. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-l(a)(l). In general,
recourse liabilities are allocated to the partner who would be
responsible for paying them if the partnership were unable to. In
order to determine who bears the economic risk of loss for a
recourse liability, the regulations employ a "constructive
liquidation" test.

4

b.

Constructive Liquidation Test. Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-2(b)(l)
provides that upon a constructive liquidation, all of the following
events are deemed to occur simultaneously:
1.
11.

All of the partnership's liabilities become payable in full;
With the exception of property contributed to secure a
partnership liability, all of the partnership's assets,
including cash, have a value of zero;

iii.

The partnership disposes of all of its propetiy in a fully
taxable transaction for no consideration (except relief from
liabilities for which the creditor's right to repayment is
limited solely to one or more assets of the patinership );

iv.

All items of income, gain, loss, or deduction are allocated
among the partners; and

v.

The partnership liquidates.

c.

A partner bears the economic risk of loss for a liability to the
extent that if the partnership constructively liquidated, the patiner
(or a related person) would be obligated to either pay a creditor or
make a contribution to the patinership because the liability would
be due and the patiner (or related person) would not be entitled to
reimbursement. Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-2(b).

d.

In circumstances where a partner is entitled to reimbursement, the
economic risk of loss is shifted to the obligor under such
reimbursement arrangement. Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-2(b)(3) provides
that all statutmy and contractual obligations relating to the
patinership liability are taken into account for purposes of
determining which patiner bears the risk of loss, including
1.

contractual obligations outside the partnership agreement
such as guarantees, indemnifications, reimbursement
agreements, and other obligations running directly to
creditors or to other partners, or to the partnership;

ii.

obligations to the patinership that are imposed by the
partnership agreement, including the obligation to make a
capital contribution and to restore a deficit capital account
upon liquidation of the patinership; and

111.

payment obligations (whether in the form of direct
remittances to another partner or a contribution to the
partnership) imposed by state law, including the governing
state partnership statute.
5

e.

Deemed Satisfaction of Obligation. For purposes of determining
the extent to which a partner or related person has a payment
obligation and bears the economic risk of loss for a recourse
liability, it is assumed that all partners and related persons actually
perform on their obligations, irrespective of their net worth, unless
the facts and circumstances indicate a plan to circumvent or avoid
the obligation. Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-2(b)(6); Treas. Reg.§ 1.7522(j)(3).
1.

Exception. A partner's or related person's obligation to
make a payment may be disregarded or treated as an
obligation of another person if the facts and circumstances
indicate that a principal purpose of the arrangement
between the parties is to eliminate the partner's economic
risk ofloss with respect to the obligation or create the
appearance that the partner or related person bears the
economic risk of loss when, in fact, the substance of the
arrangement is othe1wise. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(j)(l).

f.

Partner or Related Person as Nonrecourse Lender. A partner is
considered to bear the economic risk of loss for a partnership
liability to the extent that the partner or a related person makes (or
acquires an interest in) a nonrecourse loan to the partnership and
the economic risk of loss for the liability is not borne by another
partner. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(c).

g.

De Minimis Exceptions. If a partner has a 10-percent or less
interest (directly or indirectly) in each item of partnership income,
gain, loss, deduction, or credit then the partner is not considered to
bear the economic risk of loss with respect to:

h.

1.

a nonrecourse loan from the partner to the partnership that
constitutes qualified nonrecourse financing within the
meaning of section 465(b)( 6) (determined without regard to
the type of activity financed); or

n.

a guarantee of a loan that would othe1wise be a nonrecourse
loan of the partnership and that would constitute qualified
nonrecourse financing within the meaning of section
465(b)( 6) (determined without regard to the type of activity
financed) if the guarantor had made the loan to the
partnership. Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-2(d).
Nonrecourse Liability with Interest Guaranteed by Partner. If one
or more partners or related persons guarantee the payment of more
than 25 percent of the total interest that will accme on a
partnership nonrecourse liability over its remaining term, and it is
6

reasonable to expect that the guarantor will be required to pay
substantially all of the guaranteed future interest if the partnership
fails to do so, then the liability is treated as two separate
partnership liabilities, a guaranteed liability and a nomecourse
liability. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(e)(l).
i.

Reasonable Expectation of Payment by Guarantor. It is
reasonable to expect that the guarantor will be required to
pay substantially all of the guaranteed future interest if,
upon a default in payment by the partnership, the lender
can enforce the guaranty without foreclosing on the
collateral property. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(e)(l).

n.

Portion of Stated Principal Amount Treated as Guaranteed
Liability. The partner or related person that has guaranteed
the payment of interest is treated as bearing the economic
risk of loss for the partnership liability to the extent of the
present value of the guaranteed future interest payments.
The remainder of the stated principal amount of the
partnership liability constitutes a nomecourse liability.
Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(e)(l).
a)

iii.

Discount Rate. The present value of the guaranteed
future interest payments is computed using a
discount rate equal to either the interest rate stated
in the loan document, or if interest is imputed under
section 483 or section 1274, the applicable federal
rate, compounded semianually.
Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(e)(2).

Exceptions. The general rule ofTreas. Reg.§ 1.7522(e)(1) does not apply to a partnership nonrecourse
liability:
a)

if the guarantee of interest by the partner or related
person is for a period not in excess of the lesser of
five years or one-third of the term of the liability.
Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-2(e)(3); or

b)

if a partner that has a 10-percent or less interest
(directly or indirectly) in each item of partnership
income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit guarantees
the interest on a loan to the partnership that
constitutes qualified nomecourse financing within
the meaning of section 465(b)(6) (determined
without regard to the type of activity financed). An
allocation of interest to the extent paid by the

7

guarantor is not treated as a partnership item of
deduction or loss subject to the 10 percent or less
rule. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(e)(4).
c)

7.

Definition of Related Person. Treas. Reg. § 1.7524(b) generally provides that a person is related to a
partner if the person and partner bear a relationship
to each other that is specified in sections 267 (b) or
707(b)(l), subject to the following modifications:
[i]

Substitute "80 percent or more" for "more
than 50 percent" each place it appears in
those sections;

[ii]

A person's family is detennined by
excluding brothers and sisters; and

[iii]

Disregard sections 267(e)(l) and
267(f)(l )(A).

Partner's Share of Partnership Nonrecourse Liabilities
a.

Definition. A partnership liability is a nonrecourse liability to the
extent that no partner or related person bears the economic risk of
loss for that liability. Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-l(a)(2).

b.

Three-Tier Allocation. A partner's share of partnership
nonrecourse liabilities equals the sum of the following:
1.

A partner's share of partnership minimum gain determined
pursuant to section 704(b) (the "First Tier"). Treas. Reg. §
1.752-3(a)(l).
a)

Partnership Minimum Gain. Partnership minimum
gain is generally the excess of the nonrecourse
liability over the section 704(b) "book value" of
property securing the liability.

b)

Partner's Share ofPartnership Minimum Gain.
Treas. Reg.§ 1.704-2(g)(l) provides that a partner's
share of partnership minimum gain at the end of any
taxable year is generally equal to
the sum of partnership nonrecourse deductions
allocated to the partner up to that time and the
distributions made to the partner up to that time of
proceeds of a nonrecourse liability allocable to an
increase in partnership minimum gain; minus
8

the sum ofthe partner's aggregate share of the net
decreases in partnership minimum gain plus the
partner's aggregate share of decreases resulting
from revaluations of partnership property subject to
one or more partnership nonrecourse liabilities.
c)

ii.

Partnership Nonrecourse Deductions.
Treas. Reg. § 1.704-2(c) provides that the amount
of nonrecourse deductions for a partnership for a
taxable year generally equals the net increase in
pminership minimum gain during the year, reduced
(but not below zero) by the aggregate distributions
made during the year of proceeds of a nonrecourse
liability that are allocable to an increase in
partnership minimum gain.

The amount of any taxable gain that would be allocated to
the partner under section 704(c) (or in the same manner as
under section 704( c) if partnership property is revalued) if
the partnership disposed of all partnership propetiy subject
to nonrecourse liabilities for no consideration other than
full satisfaction ofthe liabilities. Treas. Reg.§ 1.7523(a)(2) (the "Second Tier").
a)

The amount computed under the Second Tier is
sometimes referred to as "section 704(c) minimum
gain."

b)

Where the contributed property is depreciable, the
amount of section 704(c) minimum gain (and
therefore the Second Tier allocation of debt) is
reduced over time as book and tax depreciation
deductions are claimed. When the property is fully
depreciated, section 704(c) minimum gain and the
Second Tier allocation will be reduced to zero. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(a)(3)(ii).

c)

For purposes of determining the amount of
partnership liabilities that are allocable to a patiner
under the Second Tier, where there are multiple
properties subject to a single nonrecourse liability,
the partnership may allocate the liability among the
multiple properties using any reasonable method.
Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-3(b)(l). The pmiion of the
nonrecourse liability allocated to each item of
partnership property is then treated as a separate
loan.
9

111.

d)

In general, a pminership may not change the
method of allocating a single nonrecourse liability
among multiple properties while any portion of the
liability is outstanding. Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-3(b)(l).

e)

However, when any property previously securing
the liability ceases to be subject to the liability, the
pmtion of the liability allocated to that propeliy
must be reallocated among the prope1ties still
subject to the liability. Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-3(b)(l).

f)

The method for allocation of the liability is not
reasonable if it allocates to any item of prope1iy an
amount of the liability that, when combined with
any other liabilities allocated to the prope1ty, is in
excess of the fair market value of the property at the
time the liability is incurred. Treas. Reg.§ 1.7523(b)(1 ).

The paliner's share of the excess nonrecourse liabilities
determined in accordance with the paliner's share of
partnership profits. Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-3(a)(3) (the "Third
Tier").
a)

The partner's interest in palinership profits is
determined by taking into account all facts and
circumstances related to the economic arrangement
of the paliners.

b)

The palinership agreement may specify the
paliner' s interest in palinership profits for purposes
of allocating excess nonrecourse liabilities provided
the interest so specified is reasonably consistent
with allocations (that have substantial economic
effect under the section 7 04(b) regulations) of some
significant item of partnership income or gain.

c)

Altematively, excess nonrecourse liabilities may be
allocated among the partners in accordance with the
manner in which it is reasonably expected that the
deductions attributable to those nonrecourse
liabilities will be allocated.

d)

Additionally, the palinership may frrst allocate
excess nonrecourse liabilities to a paliner up to the
amount of built-in gain that is allocable to the
partner on section 704(c) property or property for
10

which reverse section 704( c) allocations are
applicable by virtue of a book-up (as described in
Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(a)(6)(i)) where such property
is subject to the nomecourse liability to the extent
that such built-in gain exceeds the amount of gain
taken into account under the Second Tier with
respect to such property.
c.

Interplay With Section 704(c) Method
1.

Rev. Rul. 95-41, 1995-1 C.B. 132, explains how section
704(c) affects allocations of nomecourse liabilities under
Treas. Reg. § 1.752-3(a).

n.

Allocations under the First Tier are not affected by section
704(c).

111.

Allocations under the Second Tier take into account
remedial allocations of gain that would be made to the
contributing partner under Treas. Reg. § 1. 704-3( d), but do
not take into account curative allocations under
Treas. Reg. § 1. 704-3(c).

iv.

Allocations under the Third Tier are affected by section
704(c) as follows:
a)

If the partnership determines the partners' interests
in partnership profits based on all the facts and
circumstances relating to the economic arrangement
of the partners, section 704(c) built-in gain that was
taken into account under the Second Tier is one
factor, but not the only factor, to be considered
under the Third Tier.

b)

If the pminership chooses to allocate excess
nomecourse liabilities in a manner reasonably
consistent with allocations (that have substantial
economic effect under the section 704(b)
regulations) of some other significant item of
partnership income or gain, section 704(c) does not
affect the allocation of nomecourse liabilities under
the Third Tier because section 704(c) allocations do
not have substantial economic effect.

c)

If the partnership chooses to allocate the Third Tier
in accordance with the manner in which it is
reasonably expected that deductions attributable to
the nomecourse debt will be allocated, the
11

partnership must take into account the section
704(c) allocations in determining the manner in
which the deductions attributable to the nonrecourse
liabilities will be allocated.
d.

8.

Rev. Rul. 95-41 Importance Eclipsed. The importance of the
holding ofRev. Rul. 95-41 regarding the impact of section
704(c)in determining the Third Tier allocation has been eclipsed
by the rule in Treas. Reg. § 1.752-3(a)(3) allowing the Third Tier
to be allocated first to a partner up to the amount of built-in gain
allocable to such partner not taken into account in the Second Tier,
which was added by an amendment to Treas. Reg. § 1.752-3(a)(3)
issued October 30, 2000.

Disregarded Entities
a.

In General.

i.

On August 12, 2004, the Service issued proposed
regulations addressing the consequences of owning a
partnership interest through a disregarded entity (such as a
single owner LLC) on the allocation of partnership
liabilities under section 752.

ii.

On October 11, 2006, the Service issued final regulations
that largely follow the proposed regulations. The final
regulations seek to clarify the effect of the state law
liability shield provided by the disregarded entity in
determining the extent to which a partner who owns a
partnership interest through a disregarded entity may be
treated as bearing the economic risk of loss for a
partnership liability. The final regulations are effective for
liabilities incurred or assumed by a partnership on or after
October 11, 2006 other than liabilities incurred or assumed
by a partnership pursuant to a written binding contract in
effect prior to October 11, 2006.

111.

The final regulations are unquestionably based on a sound
analysis of the extent to which a partner who owns a
partnership interest through a disregarded entity bears the
economic risk of loss for a partnership liability. This
theoretical purity, however, comes at the cost of significant
taxpayer compliance burdens in an area where, based on
informal conversations with government representatives
involved in developing the regulations, there was no
evidence of taxpayer abuse. Moreover, in a closely related
area, the existing section 752 regulations deliberately
12

sacrifice theory in favor of administrability, and the final
regulations create inconsistencies with those existing
prOVISIOnS.
b.

The Final Regulations
1.

n.

In General. The final regulations provide that in
dete1mining the extent to which a partner bears the
economic risk of loss for a partnership liability, payment
obligations of a disregarded entity are taken into account
for purposes of section 752 only to the extent of the "net
value" of the disregarded entity as of the date on which the
partnership determines the partner's share of partnership
liabilities pursuant to Treas. Reg.§§ 1.752-4(d) and 1.705l(a). The new rules apply to business entities such as
single owner LLCs that are disregarded as separate from
their owner under Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1 through
301.7701-3, as well as to "qualified REIT subsidiaries"
under section 856(i) and "qualified subchapter S
subsidiaries" under section 13 61 (b)(3).
Net Value Dete1mination
a)

Under Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(k)(2), the "net value"
of a disregarded entity is equal to the fair market
value of all assets owned by the disregarded entity
that may be subject to the claims of creditors, less
obligations of the disregarded entity that do not
constitute payment obligations of the disregarded
entity that are taken into account under Treas. Reg.
§ 1.752-2(b) in determining the extent to which a
partner bears the economic risk of loss for a
partnership liability. For this purpose, a disregarded
entity's assets include the entity's enforceable rights
to contributions from its owner, but exclude the
disregarded entity's interest in the partnership (if
any). Likewise, the value of any property of the
disregarded entity that is pledged to secure a
partnership liability and therefore taken into account
under the pledge rule ofTreas. Reg. § 1.752-2(h) is
excluded. The final regulations clarify that the
value of the disregarded entity's interest in a
partnership other than the partnership for which the
net value determination is being made is included in
the net value of the disregarded entity.

13

b)

111.

In determining the net value of the disregarded
entity, the final regulations require that any
subsequent reduction in net value be taken into
account if at the time the net value is determined it
is anticipated that the reduction will occur and the
reduction is part of a plan that has as one of its
principal purposes creating the appearance that a
partner bears the economic risk of loss for a
partnership liability. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(k)(4).
In addition, if one or more disregarded entities have
payment obligations with respect to one or more
partnership liabilities, or liabilities of more than one
partnership, the partnership must allocate the net
value of each disregarded entity among partnership
liabilities in a reasonable and consistent manner,
taking into account priorities among pminership
liabilities. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(k)(3).

Redetennination of Net Value
a)

Under the final regulations, once the net value of
the disregarded entity is determined, this net value
is not redetermined unless (i) there is more than a de
minimis contribution to the disregarded entity of
property other than property pledged to secure a
partnership liability, unless the contribution is
followed immediately by a contribution of equal net
value by the disregarded entity to the partnership for
which the net value of the disregarded entity
otherwise would be determined, taking into account
any obligations assumed or taken subject to in
connection with such contributions; (ii) there is
more than a de minimis distribution from the
disregarded entity of property other than property
pledged to secure a partnership liability, unless the
distribution immediately follows a distribution of
equal net value to the disregarded entity by the
partnership for which the net value of the
disregarded entity would otherwise be determined,
taking into account any obligations assumed or
taken subject to in connection with such
distributions; (iii) a change in the legally
enforceable obligation of the owner of the
disregarded entity to make contributions to the
disregarded entity; (iv) the incurrence, refinancing,
or assumption of an obligation of the disregarded
entity that does not constitute a Treas. Reg. § 1.75214

2(b) payment obligation of the disregarded entity;
(v) the sale or exchange of a non-de minimis asset
of the disregarded entity (in a transaction that is not
in the ordinary course ofbusiness). Treas. Reg.
§ 1.752-2(k)(2).

IV.

v.

b)

The final regulations provide that a disposition of a
non-de minimis asset requires an adjustment to the
net value of the disregarded entity only to the extent
such asset changed in value, without valuing other
assets held by the disregarded entity.

c)

The final regulations provide that the net value of
the disregarded entity must be determined as of the
earlier of (A) the first date occurring on or after the
date on which the requirement to determine the net
value of the disregarded entity arises on which the
partnership otherwise determines a partner's share
of patinership liabilities under Treas. Reg. § 1. 705l(a) and Treas. Reg. § 1.752-4(d), or (B) the end of
the partnership's taxable year in which the
requirement to detetmine the net value of the
disregarded entity arises.

Reporting Requirement. The final regulations impose a
reporting obligation on partners who own partnership
interests through disregarded entities in order to enable the
partnership to properly allocate liabilities. Treas. Reg. §
1.752-2(k)(5) requires that a patiner that may be treated as
bearing the economic risk of loss for a partnership liability
based upon an obligation of a disregarded entity must
provide information as to the entity's tax classification and
net value to the patinership on a timely basis.
Pledged Property; Conforming Changes
a)

The final regulations clarify the mle ofTreas. Reg.
§ 1. 752-2(h) (which generally provides that a
partner bears the economic risk of loss to the extent
of the value of the partner's separate property
pledged as security for a partnership liability) by
providing that the extent to which a partner bears
the economic risk of loss for a partnership liability
as a result of a direct or indirect pledge is limited to
the net fair market value of the propetiy. The final
regulations further provide that if additional
property is made subject to a pledge, the addition is
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treated as a new pledge and the net fair market
value of all of the pledged property must be
determined at that time. In addition, if pledged
property is subject to one or more other obligations,
those obligations must be taken into account in
determining the net fair market value of pledge
property at the time of the pledge or contribution.
The preamble to the final regulations states that the
Service and Treasury may continue to study
whether further modifications to the pledge rule are
necessary.
b)

Vl.

c.

The final regulations also include conforming
changes to Treas. Reg. §1.704-2(±)(2), (g)(3) and
(i)(4). Those rules provide ce1iain exceptions from
the minimum gain chargeback requirements of the
section 704(b) regulations that apply when the
character of partnership debt under section 752
changes as a result of a guarantee, lapse of a
guarantee, conversion, refinancing or other change
in the debt instrument. Under the final regulations,
those rules would apply upon any change in the
character of partnership debt under section 752,
whether as a result of the circumstances specified in
the cmrent regulations or as a result of changes
under the rules of the final regulations.

Extension of Rules to Other Entities. The preamble to the
proposed regulations stated that "[t]he IRS and Treasmy
Department are considering and request comments
regarding whether the rules of the proposed regulations
should be extended to payment obligations of other entities,
such as entities that are capitalized with nominal equity."
The final regulations do not extend the net value approach
to thinly capitalized entities. However, the preamble to the
final regulations states that the Service and Treasury may
continue to study this issue.
Comments and Observations on the Regulations

1.

Should the "Deemed Satisfaction" Rule Apply to
Disregarded Entities?
a)

As discussed above, the "deemed satisfaction" rule
ofTreas. Reg. § 1.752-2(b)(6) provides that for
purposes of determining the extent to which a
partner or related person has a payment obligation
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and bears the economic risk of loss for a recourse
liability, all pminers and related persons are
assumed to actually perform their obligations,
irrespective of their net worth, unless the facts and
circumstances indicate a plan to circumvent or
avoid the obligation. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(j)
provides anti-abuse rules that prevent manipulation
or abuse of the "deemed satisfaction" rule. Treas.
Reg. § 1. 752-2(j)(l) states that an obligation of a
partner or related person to make a payment may be
disregarded or treated as an obligation of another
person for purposes of the section 752 regulations if
facts and circumstances indicate that a principal
purpose of the arrangement between the parties is to
eliminate the partner's economic risk of loss with
respect to that obligation or create the appearance of
the partner or related person bearing the economic
risk of loss when, in fact, the substance of the
arrangement is othe1wise. Likewise, Treas. Reg.§
1.752-2(j)(3) provides that an obligation of a pminer
to make a payment is not recognized if the facts and
circumstances evidence a plan to circumvent or
avoid the obligation.

(

b)

Instead of the net value approach taken by the final
regulations, the final regulations could simply have
clarified that the "deemed satisfaction" rule and
anti-abuse backstop apply to obligations of
disregarded entities. Under such an approach, the
fact that a disregarded entity that provides state law
liability protection is the obligor on a payment
obligation would not be taken into account in
determining whether the disregarded entity's owner
bears the economic risk of loss for a partnership
liability, unless the facts and circumstances
evidence a plan to circumvent or avoid the
obligation. That is, the same rules that apply with
respect to regarded entities would be applied to
disregarded entities.

c)

As illustrated by the following examples, the failure
to apply the "deemed satisfaction" rule and antiabuse backstop results in economically similar
arrangements being treated differently.

d)

Example 1.
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e)

[i]

Taxpayer is the sole owner of an LLC that
owns two assets: an interest as the sole
general partner in a limited partnership, and
land worth $20,000. The partnership has a
liability that constitutes a general obligation
ofthe partnership of$100,000.

[ii]

Under Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-2(k) and Treas.
Reg. § 1.752-1(i), the $100,000 liability is
bifurcated and treated as a recourse liability
of $20,000 with respect to which the
taxpayer bears the economic risk of loss and
a nomecourse liability of $80,000. 5 Thus,
the taxpayer includes $20,000 of the liability
in the basis of its interest in the partnership
as a recourse liability with respect to which
the taxpayer bears the economic risk of loss.

Example 2.
[i]

The facts are the same as in Example 1,
except that the taxpayer owns a 99% interest
in the LLC and the taxpayer's affiliate owns
a 1% interest. The final regulations are
inapplicable because the LLC is a regarded
entity taxable as a patinership.

[ii]

If the "deemed satisfaction" rule of Treas.
Reg. § 1.752-2(b)(6) applies, the entire
$100,000 liability is treated as a recourse
obligation of the LLC and is includible in
the basis of the taxpayer and its affiliate. 6
On the other hand, if the anti-abuse backstop

5

Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(i) states that if one or more partners bears the economic risk ofloss
as to part, but not all, of a partnership liability represented by a single contractual obligation, that
liability is treated as two or more separate liabilities for purposes of section 752. The portion of
the liability as to which one or more partners bear the economic risk of loss is a recourse liability
and the remainder of the liability, if any, is a nomecourse liability.
6

The LLC would bear the economic risk of loss with respect to the $100,000 liability and
thus would be allocated the entire liability. See Treas. Reg. § 1 752-2(i). The $100,000 liability
would then be treated as a liability of the LLC and allocated to the taxpayer and its affiliate in
accordance with the rules for allocating nomecourse liabilities (because neither the taxpayer nor
its affiliate would bear the economic risk ofloss for the liability). See Treas. Reg. § 1.752-4(a).
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mle ofTreas. Reg. § 1.752-2(j) applies
because the facts and circumstances
evidence a plan to circumvent or avoid the
obligation, then the obligation of the LLC is
not recognized, the liability is treated as
nonrecourse and no portion of the $100,000
liability is allocated to the LLC as a recourse
liability. 7
f)

In terms of their actual exposure to economic loss
on account ofthe $100,000 liability, the taxpayers
in Examples 1 and 2 are identically situated.
Nevertheless, the regulations provide for three
different allocations of the liability depending on
the details of the ownership stmcture and the
application of the anti-abuse backstop mle.

g)

The preamble to the proposed regulations
acknowledged that applying the "deemed
satisfaction" mle would lead to the conclusion that
payment obligations of a disregarded entity should
be allocated to its owner for tax purposes because
the owner and the disregarded entity are treated as a
single entity for Federal income tax purposes.
Nevertheless, the final regulations adopt the net
value approach discussed above. The preamble to
the proposed regulations states that "because only
the assets of a disregarded entity may be available
to satisfy payment obligations undertaken by the
disregarded entity, a partner should be treated as
bearing the economic risk of loss for a partnership
liability as a result of those payment obligations
only to the extent of the net value of the disregarded
entity's assets." While that logic is unassailable,
interests of administrability would argue in favor of
extending the "deemed satisfaction" mle to
disregarded entities, particularly in light of the fact
that government representatives involved in
developing the regulations have indicated

7

In both Example 1 and Example 2, to the extent the $100,000 liability is treated as a
nonrecourse liability of the partnership, some portion may still be allocated to the taxpayer and
its affiliate under the mles relating to the allocation of nonrecourse liabilities. See generally
Treas. Reg. § 1.752-3.
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informally that they are not aware of any evidence
of taxpayer abuse in this area. Nevertheless,
Treasury and the Service made the call the other
way.
11.

Time for Determining Liability Shares
a)

Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(k)(2)(iv) requires that the net
value of a disregarded entity be determined "on the
earlier of (A) the first date occmTing on or after the
date on which the requirement to determine the net
value of a disregarded entity arises under paragraph
(k)(2)(ii)(A) or (B) of this section on which the
partnership otherwise determines a partner's share
of partnership liabilities under§§ 1.705-l(a) and
1.752-4(d); or (B) the end of the partnership's
taxable year in which the requirement to determine
the net value of a disregarded entity arises under
paragraph (k)(2)(ii)(A) or (B). Treas. Reg. § 1.7524(d) states that "[a] partner's share ofpartnership
liabilities must be determined whenever the
determination is necessary in order to determine the
tax liability of the partner or any other person."
Treas. Reg.§ 1.705-l(a) states that:
A partner is required to determine
the adjusted basis of his interest in a
partnership only when necessary for
the determination of his tax liability
or that of any other person. The
determination of the adjusted basis
of a partnership interest is ordinarily
made as of the end of a partnership
taxable year.

b)

Under section 731(a)(l), a partner must recognize
gain to the extent that any money distributed
exceeds the adjusted basis of such partner's interest
in the partnership immediately before the
distribution. Moreover, a decrease in a partner's
share of liabilities is treated as a deemed
distribution of money under section 7 52(b) that
potentially triggers gain under section 731(a)(l).
As a result, it appears that a partnership must
determine liability shares whenever there is a
decrease in any partner's share (which may be
attributable to an increase in another partner's
20

share), because the decrease must be compared
against the partner's basis immediately before to
determine if gain is triggered.
c)

Nevertheless, examples in the final regulations
appear to assume that the partnership only
determines liability shares at the end of the tax year.
In Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-2(k)(6), Example 2, A forms
a wholly owned LLC in 2007 with a capital
contribution of $100,000, which LLC contributes to
a limited partnership. LLC is the only partner with
a capital account deficit restoration obligation. In
2008, LLC bonows $300,000 on a recourse basis.
As ofDecember 31,2008, when the partnership
first dete1mines liability shares, no portion of the
liability is treated as recourse with respect to LLC
because LLC has no net value. Thereafter, on
January 1, 2009, A contributes $250,000 to LLC,
and on Januaty 5, 2009, LLC bonows $100,000,
and purchases land for $350,000, which declines in
value to $275,000 by December 31, 2009.

d)

In analyzing the results for 2009, Treas. Reg. §
1.752-2(k)(6), Example 2 concludes that because
the partnership dete1mines debt shares as of yearend, $175,000 of the partnership's liabilities are
treated as recourse with respect to LLC, which is
equal to the net value of LLC on December 31,
2009. In fact, however, it appears that the
partnership would be required by Treas. Reg. §
1.752-4(d) to determine debt shares as ofthe
Janua1y 1, 2009 date of A's capital contribution to
LLC, because as of that date a portion of the
patinership's liabilities would become recourse with
respect to LLC, thereby producing a deemed
distribution to the other partners under section
752(b) that is potentially taxable to them under
section 731(a)(1)(a). Moreover, applying the net
value test on January 1, 2009 creates different
results, because the equity value of the property
owned by LLC on Janua1y 1, 2009 is $250,000
(rather than $175,000 at year end). Furthe1more, no
event occurs between Janumy 5 and December 31,
2009 that would allow a redetermination ofLLC's
net value. Thus, on the facts ofTreas. Reg.§ 1.7522(k)(6), Example 2, whether $175,000 or $250,000
of partnership liabilities are treated as recourse with
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respect to LLC depends on the time the partnership
is required to determine liabilities.
111.

1v.

Reporting and Compliance Issues.
a)

As discussed above, Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(k)(5)
requires that a partner that may be treated as bearing
the economic risk of loss for a partnership liability
based upon an obligation of a disregarded entity
must provide information as to the entity's tax
classification and net value to the partnership on a
timely basis.

b)

The regulations do not address a variety of related
reporting and compliance issues raised by the net
value approach. What level of diligence is required
of the disregarded entity in determining its net
value? Are appraisals of assets required? Is expert
evaluation of contingent obligations that may
reduce net value required? Is annual reporting to
the partnership sufficient, or is more frequent
reporting required if an event occurs that requires
redetermination of value? Is a statement that the net
value of the disregarded entity exceeds its payment
obligations sufficient, or must the disregarded entity
report a dollar amount for its net value (thereby
revealing potentially confidential financial
information)? May the partnership simply accept
the information as repmied by the disregarded
entity, or does the partnership have an obligation to
investigate or confirm the information? How
should the partnership allocate its liabilities if the
disregarded entity fails to supply the required
information?

c)

These and other questions relating to compliance
with the new rules await further explication.

"Obligations" of Disregarded Entity Taken into Account
a)

As discussed above, pursuant to Treas. Reg.
§ 1.752-2(k)(2), the "net value" of a disregarded
entity is equal to the fair market value of all assets
owned by the disregarded entity that may be subject
to the claims of creditors, "less obligations of the
disregarded entity that do not constitute Treas. Reg.
§ 1.752-2(b)(l) payment obligations ofthe
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disregarded entity." The second use of the word
"obligations" in the quoted language clearly refers
to obligations described in Treas. Reg. § 1.7522(b)(l). The first use of the word "obligations"
apparently is intended to refer to some broader
category. Informal discussions with government
officials involved in developing the regulations
confirm that the first use of the word "obligations"
is intended to be vety broad and would encompass,
for example, an obligation to make payments under
a lease. Assuming that first use of the word
"obligations" includes an obligation to make
payments under a lease, it is not clear how such an
obligation should be taken into account. For
example, is the stream of required lease payments to
be discounted to present value at a particular
interest rate? Or is the obligation to make payments
under a lease taken into account only to the extent
that the lease is at an above market rent such that
the taxpayer would pay to be relieved of the
obligation? The final regulations could have
referred to the definition of obligations contained in
Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-l(a)(l)(ii), as follows:
(ii) Obligation. For purposes of this
paragraph and§ 1.752-7, an obligation is
any fixed or contingent obligation to
make payment without regard to whether
the obligation is otherwise taken into
account for purposes of the Internal
Revenue Code. Obligations include, but
are not limited to, debt obligations,
environmental obligations, tort
obligations, contract obligations, pension
obligations, obligations under a short
sale, and obligations under derivative
financial instruments such as options,
forward contracts, and futures contracts.
b)

v.

Presumably, the "amount" of any such obligation
should be the amount of cash that a willing assignor
would pay to a willing assignee to assume the
obligation in an arm's-length transaction. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.752-7(b)(3)(ii).

Conforming Changes to Section 704(b) Regulations
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a)

The section 704(b) regulations contain an anti-abuse
rule that is similar to the anti-abuse rule in the
section 752 regulations that "backstops" the
"deemed satisfaction" rule. Specifically, Treas.
Reg.§ 1.704-l(b)(2)(ii)(c) provides:
A partner in no event will be considered
obligated to restore the deficit balance in
his capital account to the partnership (in
accordance with requirement (3) of
paragraph (b)(2)(ii)(b) of this section) to
the extent such partner's obligation is
not legally enforceable, or the facts and
circumstances otherwise indicate a plan
to avoid or circumvent such obligation.

b)

v1.

Consistent with the treatment of disregarded entities
under the final regulations, Treas. Reg. § 1.704l(b)(2)(ii)(c) should be amended to provide that a
deficit restoration obligation of a disregarded entity
will only be taken into account for purposes of the
regulations under section 704(b) to the extent of the
net value of the disregarded entity.

Allocation ofNet Value.
a)

Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(k)(3) provides that if one or
more disregarded entities have payment obligations
with respect to one or more partnership liabilities,
or liabilities of more than one partnership, the
partnership must allocate the net value of each
disregarded entity among partnership liabilities in a
reasonable and consistent manner, taking into
account priorities among partnership liabilities.

b)

Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(k)(6), Example 4, concludes
that an allocation of net value first to the
partnership's senior debt and only thereafter to its
junior debt is a reasonable method of allocating net
value. In fact, the partnership's property will be
used to satisfy its senior debt first, so it is more
likely that the disregarded entity's net value will be
used to satisfy the pminership's junior debt.

c)

Thus, arguably, it would make more sense to
allocate the net value of the disregarded entity to
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junior debt first. C£ Treas. Reg. § 1. 704-2(m),
Example 1 (vii).
d)

B.

Informal discussions with govemment personnel
involved in developing the regulations indicate that
they view the allocation of net value to senior debt
first as consistent with the constructive liquidation
test of the section 752 regulations, but that in certain
circumstances, it might be reasonable to allocate to
the junior debt first.

TECHNIQUES FOR MANAGING LIABILITY ALLOCATIONS
1.

Introduction. This Part II.B. illustrates various techniques for managing
the allocation of liabilities through a series of examples in the context of a
limited partnership as well as the various special considerations that arise
in the context of limited liability companies.

2.

Managing Liability Allocations in Limited Partnerships
a.

Example 3: Nonrecourse Debt; Conventional Guarantee. Assume
that X is a limited partner in a limited partnership and is allocated
one percent of partnership profits and losses. The partnership's
only debt is a nonrecourse debt of $100 from a third party.
Assume that X must maintain a share of the debt at least equal to
$10 in order to avoid receiving a deemed distribution under section
752(b) that will exceed X's basis in its partnership interest and
trigger gain under section 731(a). X enters into a guarantee of$10
of the debt that is legally enforceable under state law. Under the
guarantee, X has no right of subrogation against any other party.
1.

Tax Consequences. The guarantee should cause $10 of the
debt to be allocated to X. X bears the economic risk of loss
with respect to $10 of the liability. The liability is treated
as two separate liabilities for purposes of section 7 52: a $10
recourse liability and a $90 nonrecourse liability.
Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-l(i). Upon a constructive liquidation,
all assets of the partnership would have a value of zero, and
any assets securing the nonrecourse liability would be
conveyed to the lender in satisfaction of the nonrecourse
debt. X would be obligated to pay $10 to the lender and
would not have any right to recover the payment from any
other party. Accordingly, X bears the economic risk of loss
for $10 and is allocated $10 of the debt. See
Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-2(£), Example 5.

(
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n.

b.

Maintaining an Amount At-Risk Under Section 465 With a
Guarantee
a)

Section 465(a) generally provides that, in the case
of an individual and certain closely held
corporations, any loss from an activity for the
taxable year shall be allowed only to the extent of
the aggregate amount with respect to which the
taxpayer is at risk at the close of the taxable year.

b)

Section 465( e)(1) provides that if a taxpayer's atrisk amount is reduced below zero then losses
previously allowed for a taxable year to which the
rules apply are recaptured to the extent of the
negative amount.

c)

Section 465(b) provides that a taxpayer is
considered at risk to the extent of any money
contributed to an activity by the taxpayer, and with
respect to any money borrowed by the taxpayer to
be used in the activity, to the extent that the
taxpayer is personally liable for repayment, subject
to certain exceptions.

d)

As discussed in more detail below, case law
supports the conclusion that a properly structured
guarantee increases a partner's amount at risk.

Example 4: Nonrecourse Debt; "Bottom" Guarantee.
1.

The facts are the same as the facts in Example 3, except
that X enters into a $10 "bottom" guarantee of the debt. A
"bottom guarantee" is a guarantee of the last dollars of the
debt, which is the least risky portion of the debt. The
"bottom" guarantee provides:
"X shall not be obligated to make any payment
hereunder until all attempts to collect from
Borrower, with due diligence and using reasonable
means, have failed to produce gross proceeds to
Lender (not taking into account any costs incurred
by the Lender in collecting such proceeds) of at
least $10. Such attempts shall include the
exhaustion of all rights and remedies at law and in
equity that Lender may have against Borrower and
the Collateral securing the Loan."
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Thus, in general, X will only have economic exposure
under the bottom guaranty to the extent the value of the
collateral declines below $10.
11.

111.

1v.

Tax Consequences. Although as a practical matter, a
decline in the value of the collateral to below $10 may be
unlikely, X would be considered to bear the economic risk
of loss with respect to $10 of the debt because the
constructive liquidation analysis ofTreas. Reg. § 1.7522(b )(1) assumes that the value of all partnership assets is
zero. Accordingly, the "bottom" guarantee would cause
$10 of the debt to be allocated to X.
The fact that the "bottom" guarantee may be entered into
with a tax motivation should not detract from this
conclusion.
a)

Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-2(b) contains no inquily into
tax motivation or purpose, but only as to economic
risk of loss. In addition, Treas. Reg. § 1. 704-2(m),
Example 1(vii) specifically addresses the
consequences of a "bottom" guarantee on the
computation of "minimum gain" under the section
704(b) regulations, but does not in any way suggest
that the "bottom" guarantee is illusory or should be
disregarded.

b)

Likewise, Treas. Reg. I. 73 7-4(b), Example 2
involves a fact pattem in which a partner guarantees
a partnership nonrecourse debt with a principal
purpose of increasing the partner's basis under
section 752(a) and avoiding gain under section 737.
(Section 737 generally requires gain recognition in
the case of certain distributions of property to a
partner to the extent the fair market value of the
property exceeds the partner's basis in the
partnership interest). Notwithstanding this
malicious principal purpose, the example concludes
that the basis increase under section 752(a) must be
given effect and that the section 737 gain is
therefore avoided.

Therefore, a "bottom" guarantee allows a partner to
maintain a required level of partnership debt allocation with
significantly less risk than a conventional guarantee.
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v.

An issue arises as to who bears the ultimate "economic risk
of loss" when a limited partner of a partnership guarantees
an othetwise nonrecourse debt of the patinership and the
general partner has a capital account deficit restoration
obligation ("DRO"). Accordingly, when structuring a
guarantee arrangement, the documents should provide that
in the event that the general partner has a DRO, the specific
debt subject to the limited partner's guarantee is, in effect,
excluded from the general patiner's DRO. In addition, for
the guarantee to be effective, the limited partner must
waive its right of subrogation against the partnership.

c.

Example 5: Recourse Debt; Conventional Guarantee. The facts
are the same as in Example 3, except that the debt is recourse.
1.

d.

Tax Consequences. X's guarantee will not cause $10 of
debt to be allocated to X. Upon a constructive liquidation,
all assets of the patinership have a value of zero. Because
the debt is recourse, the lender can proceed against the
general patiner's separate assets to collect the debt.
Alternatively, the general partner may be viewed as having
an obligation to make a contribution to the partnership to
enable it to pay the debt. Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-2(f), Example
3. Moreover, subject to an anti-abuse rule to prevent
manipulation, all patiners and related persons who have
obligations to make payments are presumed to perform
those obligations, irrespective of their actual net worth.
Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-2(b)(6). Accordingly, the general
partner is deemed to satisfy the debt and the lender is
deemed not to call upon X's guarantee. Therefore, X is
deemed not to be required to make a payment on the
guarantee and X does not bear the risk of loss for any pa1i
of the debt. See Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(f), Example 3.

Example 6: Recourse Debt; Indemnification Obligation. The facts
are the same as the facts in Example 5, except that instead of
entering into a guarantee of the recourse debt, X enters into an
indemnification agreement with the general partner ofX's limited
partnership under which X would indemnify the general partner for
up to $10 if the general partner is required to make a payment on
the debt.
1.

Tax Consequences. As a result of the indemnification
agreement, X bears the ultimate risk of loss with respect to
$10 of the debt because X would be required to make a $10
payment to the general partner under the constructive
liquidation analysis where all of the partnership's assets
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have a value of zero. Accordingly, X is allocated $10 of
the debt.
e.

Termination of a Guarantee or Indemnification Agreement. In
some cases, a partner that enters into a guarantee or
indemnification agreement in order to receive a debt allocation will
want the guarantee or indemnification to terminate upon the
partner's exit from the partnership.
1.

Various approaches have been taken by practitioners to
terminate a guarantee or indemnification agreement.
a)

Some guarantees or indemnity agreements are
structured so that they can be terminated at will,
provided that an independent appraisal of the
property subject to the debt establishes that the
property has a value equal to the outstanding debt
on the property or a multiple thereof. The appraisal
requirement should prevent the Service from
arguing that a guarantee or indemnity agreement is
illusory because a guarantor could not terminate the
agreement if the guarantor would otherwise be
called upon to perfmm on the agreement. In
addition, the "constructive liquidation" analysis
looks at a specific point in time for purposes of
allocating liabilities. There is no inquily regarding
the future termination of a guarantee.

b)

Limited partners in umbrella partnership real estate
investment trusts ("UPREIT") may structure
guarantees or indemnities that expire upon the
conversion of operating partnership ("OP") units
("OP Units") to stock of the real estate investment
trust ("REIT"). 8

8

An UPREIT is a REIT where substantially all of the assets of the REIT are owned
through an OP composed of the REIT as general partner and others as limited partners. Limited
partners in the OP typically have the option to exchange OP Units for common stock of the REIT
on a one-for-one basis. For further discussion of debt management issues in the context of
REIT's, see Blake D. Rubin, Andrea R. Macintosh and Jonathan I. Forrest, Doing A Deal With
A REIT: The Property Owner's Perspective, New York University 5ih Institute on Federal
Taxation§ 15.01 (1999).
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f.

c)

An automatic tetmination seems literally to be
effective under the constructive liquidation analysis
because it looks only at a specific point in time for
purposes of allocating liabilities.

d)

However, allowing a guarantee or indemnification
agreement to automatically expire upon conversion
of OP Units to REIT stock may raise questions
about the validity of the entire anangement. For
example, where a limited patiner in an operating
partnership can convert its OP Units into stock at
any time, it follows that any time that it appears that
the limited patiner would be called upon to perform
on the guarantee or indemnity, the limited partner
could conveti its OP Units to REIT stock in order to
avoid incuning liability. The Service may attempt
to attack the guarantee or indemnity and deny the
allocation of debt to the limited partner under these
circumstances.

e)

A safer approach is to establish a tetm for the
guarantee or indemnity. Under this structure, the
guarantee or indemnity can be renewed at the option
of the limited partner, but the limited patiner could
not terminate the guarantee or indemnity at will.

f)

The most conservative approach would be to
provide that the guarantee or indemnity continues in
full force and effect until repayment of the
underlying indebtedness.

Example 7: Recourse Debt; Conventional DRO. The facts are the
same as the facts in Example 3, except that, instead of entering into
a guarantee, X enters into a DRO for $10. Under the DRO, upon
liquidation ofX's interest in the partnership, X will be obligated to
make a capital contribution to the patinership equal to the lesser of
$10 or the amount ofX's deficit capital account. Assume further
that the partnership agreement meets the requirements of the safe
harbor ofTreas. Reg. § 1.704-l(b)(2), and that, in lieu of the one
percent allocation of losses to X described in Example 3, the
partnership agreement requires that X be allocated all losses until
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X's capital account equals ($10). Finally, assume that the "book"
balance sheet of the partnership reflects the following: 9
Property 80

100 Liability

( .20) X
(19.80) Other Partners

1.

g.

Tax Consequences. X's DRO should cause $10 ofthe debt
to be allocated to X. Upon a constructive liquidation of the
partnership, the Property would have a zero value and the
partnership would be deemed to dispose of it for no
consideration, resulting in an $80 loss. Of this amount,
$9.80 would be allocated to X and the balance would be
allocated to the other partners. X would have a deficit
capital account of $10, and would be required to contribute
this amount to the partnership. As a result, X would bear
the economic risk of loss for $10 of the debt. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(£), Example 2.
Example 8: Recourse Debt; "Bottom" DRO. Through careful
drafting of the loss allocation, X's DRO could be turned into a
"bottom" DRO. That is, the first $70.20 ofloss on disposition of
the Property could be allocated to partners other than X, and only
the final $9.80 ofloss could be allocated to X. As a result, only if
the Property declined in value below $9.80 would X actually
receive a loss allocation that increases X's deficit capital account
and thus X's obligation to make a capital contribution.

1.

Tax Consequences. Like a conventional DRO, a "bottom"
DRO should cause $10 of the debt to be allocated to X
because the value of the property would be deemed to be
zero under the constructive liquidation analysis and X
would be required to satisfy its obligations under the DRO.
Thus, X would bear the risk of loss with respect to $10 of
the debt.

9

"Book" capital accounts are capital accounts maintained in accordance with the capital
account maintenance rules set forth in Treas. Reg.§ 1.704-1(b)(2). "Tax basis" capital accounts
are maintained in the same manner as "book" capital accounts, except that contributed (or
revalued) property is reflected at its adjusted tax basis and thereafter adjusted to reflect
depreciation allowable for tax purposes.
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11.

A "bottom" DRO would effectively decrease X's practical
economic risk under the DRO. Indeed, at least in a multiasset pmtnership, a "bottom" DRO likely would impose
less practical economic risk on X than a "bottom"
guarantee of a specific nonrecourse debt. A "bottom"
guarantee of a specific debt would expose X if there is a
decline in value of the collateral below the guaranteed
amount.

iii.

In contrast, a "bottom" DRO would generally expose X
only if the combined value of all assets of the partnership
falls to below the DRO amount. The analysis is somewhat
more complex if the partnership has secured nonrecourse
debt. In that case, assuming the assets securing the
nonrecourse debt have "book" value at least equal to the
nonrecourse debt, X would only be exposed if the value of
all partnership assets in excess of its nonrecourse debt
declines to below the DRO amount.

IV.

In addition, a "bottom" guarantee of a specific debt could
be called upon if there is a default under the specific debt
that is guaranteed. This could occur even if a multi-asset
partnership is financially healthy (if, for example, the
specific property securing the nonrecourse debt is nonperfonning). In contrast, a "bottom" DRO could be called
upon only if the multi -asset partnership is actually
liquidated, which may not occur even if the partnership
goes into bankmptcy.
Deficit Restoration Obligations, At-Risk Amounts and Hubert

h.
1.

Background
a)

In Hubert Enterprises v. Commissioner, 125 T.C.
No.6 (September 21, 2005) ("Hubert I"), the Tax
Court held that a deficit restoration obligation
("DRO") imposed on the members of a limited
liability company engaged in an equipment leasing
business did not increase the at-risk amounts of the
members for purposes of section 465 because,
pursuant to the operating agreement of the limited
liability company, the DROs were not effective
until the members' interests in the limited liability
company were liquidated. The taxpayer in Hubert I
appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.
While there were other issues in Hubert I that were
on appeal to the Sixth Circuit, this outline discusses
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only the Tax Court's and the Sixth Circuit's
analysis and holdings with respect to the impact of a
DRO on a limited liability company member's atrisk amount under section 465.
b)

On April27, 2007, the Sixth Circuit found that the
Tax Court failed to analyze whether the taxpayer
was at risk with respect to the limited liability
company's recourse liabilities under the applicable
"payor of last resmi" standard. The Sixth Circuit
vacated the Tax Court's decision in Hubert I with
respect to the taxpayer's at-risk amount and
remanded the case to the Tax Court for further
proceedings. For our previous discussion of Hubert
I and the Sixth Circuit's decision on appeal, see
Rubin, Whiteway and Finkelstein, "Hubert
Enterprises, Inc.: Does A Capital Account Deficit
Restoration Obligation Increase a Partner's At-Risk
Amount or Share of Liabilities," 9 Journal of
Passthrough Entities No.2 (2006) ("Hubert Article
1"), and Rubin, Whiteway and Finkelstein, "Sixth
Circuit Vacates Controversial Hubert Case Dealing
with Partner's Amount at-Risk," 10 Journal of
Passthrough Entities No. 4 (2007) ("Hubert Article
2").

c)

On February 28, 2008, the Tax Court issued its
decision in Hubert Enterprises v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo 2008-46 (2008) ("Hube1i II"). In
Hubert II, the Tax Court, purporting to apply an
analysis of the "payor of last resort" standard to the
facts at issue in Hubert I, essentially restated its
earlier decision and concluded that the taxpayer's
DRO did not cause the taxpayer to be considered
the "payor oflast resort." As we have previously
discussed, we disagree with the Tax Court's
application of the "payor of last resort" standard.

d)

The taxpayer has not appealed Hube1i II, and the
period for filing an appeal has expired. Rule 190 of
the U.S. Tax Court Rules of Practice & Procedure
(June 30, 2003) provides for a 90-day period to
appeal a Tax Court holding.

e)

Although Hubert I and Hubert II involved members
of a limited liability company, the Tax Court's
holding would seem to apply equally to limited
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partners of a limited partnership. Accordingly,
based on the Tax Court's decision, we believe it is
no longer advisable to use a DRO to increase a
taxpayer's at-risk amount under section 465 with
respect to a recourse liability of a limited liability
company or a limited partnership.
f)

n.

We note that Real Estate Investment Trust operating
limited partnerships ("OP") often do not allow
limited partners to guarantee specific partnership
debt, but rather permit a DRO in order to protect
limited partners from recognizing gain as a result of
reduction in the limited partner's at-risk amount or a
deemed distribution of cash under section 752 upon
a contribution of encumbered property to the OP.
In light of Hubert II, these anangements should be
reconsidered.

Hubert I
a)

Facts Related to the Members' DROs
[i]

Leasing Company LLC ("LCL"), formed in
1998, was treated as a partnership for
Federal income tax purposes. Hubert
Commerce Center, Inc. ("HCC") owned 1%
of the units ofLCL, which HCC received in
exchange for an initial $100 capital
contribution, and HBW, Inc. ("HBW"),
owned 99% of the units of LCL, which
HBW received in exchange for an initial
$9,900 capital contribution. HBW also
contributed all ofHBW's rights, title and
interest in its leases, subject to existing
loans.

[ii]

LCL was engaged in computer equipment
leasing. LCL purchased computer
equipment from unrelated parties. The
purchase of the computer equipment was
financed with debt that was partially
recourse to the assets of LCL.

[iii]

LCL's operating agreement provided that
"no member shall be liable as such for the
liabilities of [LCL]." On March 28, 2001,
the operating agreement of LCL was
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amended and restated, effective retroactively
to Janumy 1, 2000, to provide that "[i]f any
partner has a deficit Capital Account
following liquidation of his, her or its
interest in the partnership, then he, she or it
shall restore the amount of such deficit
balance to the Partnership by the end of such
taxable year or, if later, within 90 days after
the date of such liquidation, for payment to
creditors or distribution to Partners with
positive capital account balances." During
2000 and 2001, neither HBW nor HCC
liquidated its interest in LCL and, according
to the Tax Court, neither member had a
deficit capital account balance. According
to the Tax Court, from LCL's formation in
1998 through 2001, LCL had a net loss of
over $13.9 million.

b)

[iv]

The members ofLCL claimed that they
were at risk under section 465 for portions
ofLCL's losses on account of their DROs.

[v]

The Service argued that the DRO contained
in the LCL operating agreement was not
operative during the relevant years because a
member's obligation would not be triggered
unless such member's interest in LCL was
liquidated. Alternatively, the Service argued
that even if the DROs were operative, the
members were not liable for LCL's recourse
liabilities because a third party lender did
not have the right to enforce the members'
payment obligations.

Tax Court's Holding in Hubert I
[i]

The Tax Court in Hubert I held that LCL's
members were not at risk for LCL's
recourse obligations because the obligations
were not personally guaranteed by the
members and, under applicable Wyoming
law, the members of a limited liability
company are not personally liable for the
debts, obligations, or liabilities of the limited
liability company. The Tax Court stated
that, "[b]ecause LCL's members did not
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assume personal liability for the notes, the
members are not at risk under section
465(b)(l)(B) and (2)(A) with respect to
LCL's recourse obligations. Cf. Emershaw
v. Commissioner, [91-2 USTC ~50,551], 949
F.2d 841 (6th Cir. 1991), affg. [Dec.
46,589(M)] T.C. Memo. 1990-246." The
Tax Court's entire analysis with respect to
the impact of the members' DROs on their
at-risk amounts was limited to the following
paragraph:

iii.

[ii]

Petitioners seek a contraty result, focusing
on the deficit capital account restoration
provision in section 7. 7 of the revised LCL
operating agreement. Petitioners argue that
this provision made LCL' s members
personally liable for LCL's recourse
obligations for purposes of applying the atrisk mles. We disagree. As observed by
respondent, section 7. 7 contains a condition
that must be met before the deficit capital
account restoration obligation arises. In
accordance with that condition, an LCL
member must first liquidate its interest in
LCL before the member has any obligation
to the entity. Neither HBW nor HCC
liquidated its interest in LCL during the
relevant years.

[iii]

Without citing any precedent regarding the
determination of a partner's at-risk amount
under section 465, the Tax Court in Hubert I
held that the DROs could not put LCL's
members at risk until their interests were
liquidated.

Appeal to the Sixth Circuit
a)

The taxpayer appealed the Tax Court's decision to
the Sixth Circuit, arguing that the Tax Court's
decision in Hubert I was contrary to the Sixth
Circuit's holding inEmershaw. See Brief for
Petitioners-Appellants Hubeti Enterprises and
Subsidiaries and Hubert Holding Company, 2006
TNT 75-46 (Jan. 24, 2006). The Real Estate
Roundtable, National Association of Real Estate
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Investment Tmsts and National Association of
Realtors submitted a Brief of Amici Curiae to the
Sixth Circuit in support of reversal of the Tax
Court's decision with respect to the impact of a
DRO on a taxpayer's at-risk amount under section
465. See Brief of Amici Curiae Real Estate
Roundtable, National Association of Real Estate
Investment Tmsts and National Association of
Realtors In Support of Reversal In Part, 2006 TNT
84-21 (Jan. 24, 2006).
b)

In Emershaw, the taxpayer invested in Leasing
Equipment Associates-83 ("LEA"), which was a
state law limited partnership engaged in an
equipment leasing business. According to the Tax
Court in that case, all of the partners of LEA elected
not to be subject to subchapter K of the Code under
section 761 for the years at issue. In addition, the
LEA partnership agreement provided that any
partner could withdraw from the partnership and
receive an undivided interest in all of the
partnership's property. The taxpayer agreed to
assume a pro rata share of LEA's recourse note
payable to the lessee with respect to LEA's
purchase of its equipment. Pursuant to the
equipment lease, the lessee was obligated to make
payments to LEA equal to LEA's payments due
under LEA's recourse note. In addition, the lessee's
payments were guaranteed by the lessee's parent,
which the Tax Court described as a good credit risk.
The Sixth Circuit held that the taxpayer was at risk
with respect to the taxpayer's pro rata share of the
recourse note because the taxpayer was personally
liable on the note and, in a worst case scenario, the
taxpayer would be the "payor oflast resort."

c)

The taxpayer in Hubert I argued to the Sixth Circuit
that, consistent with Emershaw, pursuant to the
DRO contained in LCL's operating agreement,
"with respect to LCL's recourse debt obligations,
LCL's members are the payors of last resort"
because "the effect of a DRO is to personally
obligate a member to contribute funds to an entity
when its capital account is negative."

d)

In its brief to the Sixth Circuit, the Service noted
that the amendment to LCL's partnership agreement
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that added the DRO, which purported to be
effective as of Januaty 1, 2000, was not adopted
until March 28, 2001. See Final Brief for the
Appellee, 2006 TNT 166-25 (May 4, 2006) (the
"Service Brief'). The Service stated that LCL's
taxable year ends on July 29. The Service argued
that, because the DRO was not adopted prior to
2001, it could not be effective for any taxable year
prior to 200 1. The Service further argued that,
notwithstanding the existence of the DRO, the
taxpayer was not at risk with respect to LCL' s
recourse liabilities because, under Wyoming law,
members of a limited liability company are not
personally liable for the company's liabilities. In
addition, the Service argued that taxpayer's DRO
did not cause it to become personally liable for
LCL's recourse liabilities because the taxpayer's
obligations under the DRO were contingent on (1)
the taxpayer's interest in LCL being liquidated, and
(2) the taxpayer having a deficit capital account
upon such a liquidation.
e)

1v.

As noted above, the Sixth Circuit found that the Tax
Court's opinion failed to address whether the DRO
caused LCL's members to be at-risk under the
"payor of last resort" standard. The Sixth Circuit
vacated the decision in Hubert I and remanded the
case to the Tax Court for further proceedings.

Tax Court's Decision in Hubert II
a)

On remand, the Tax Court in Hubert II found that
the DRO did not cause the members of LCL to be
the "payors of last resort" with respect to LCL's
recourse debt.

b)

First, the Tax Court agreed with the Service's
argument that, because the DRO's were not added
to the LCL partnership agreement until March 28,
2001, the DRO was not effective for LCL's 2000
taxable year. Section 761(c) generally provides that
"[f]or purposes of this subchapter, a partnership
agreement includes any modifications of the
partnership agreement made prior to, or at, the time
prescribed by law for the filing of the partnership
return for the taxable year (not including
extensions) .... " In addition, section 465(a)(l)
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provides that a taxpayer's at-risk amount must be
determined as of the close of the taxable year.
Because LCL's pminershifo return for its taxable
year ended July 31, 2000, 0 was required (absent
extension) to be filed by November 15,2000, the
Tax Court concluded that the amendment to the
partnership agreement on March 28, 2001, could
not impact LCL's members' at-risk amounts for the
taxable year ended July 31, 2000. 11 T.C. Memo
2008-46 at 270-271.
c)

Second, the Tax Court stated that "HBW did not
through the DRO make an unconditional promise to
contribute additional capital to LCL." T.C. Memo
2008-46 at 27l.The Tax Court found that "the DRO
contained in the LCL operating agreement requires
that HBW contribute additional capital only if: (1)
HBW liquidates its interest in LCL and (2) then has
a deficit in its capital account." Id. at 271. The Tax
Court further found that LCL's recourse creditor
does not have a right under Wyoming law to force
HBW to liquidate its interest in LCL in order to
cause HBW to make an additional capital
contribution to LCL and that, even if a liquidation
ofHBW's interest in LCL could be compelled,
HBW would not have to make an additional capital
contribution unless it had a negative capital account
as of such date. The Tax Comi stated:
Given that the DRO requires
additional capital contributions only
when a member "has a deficit
Capital Account following the

10

We note that the Service Brief stated that LCL' s taxable year ended on July 29, 2000
while the Tax Court stated in Hubert II that LCL's taxable year ended on July 31, 2000.
11

Query whether, in applying section 7 61 (c) in its dete1mination of the effectiveness of an
amendment to LCL's operating agreement in order to alter the at-risk amount of a partner for a
taxable year, the Tax Court implicitly acknowledged that a retroactive partnership agreement
amendment can be effective under section 465, provided the amendment is consummated on or
before the original due date for the partnership's tax return for such year. We note that a similar
issue arises with respect to the effect of a retroactive amendment on a partner's allocation of
partnership liabilities under section 752 (although unlike section 465, section 752 is in the same
subchapter as section 761(c)).

39

liquidation of * * * its interest" in
LCL and that no creditor of LCL
could compel a liquidation of
HBW' s interest in LCL, we conclude
that HBW is not a payor of last resort
because HBW is not "personally
liable for the repayment" of any of
LCL' s recourse debt within the
meaning of section 465(b)(2)(A). In
other words, we conclude that HBW
is not personally liable for the
repayment of any ofLCL's recourse
debt because HBW's obligation to
contribute additional funds to LCL is
not unavoidable in that HBW can
avoid contributing additional capital
under the DRO simply by not
liquidating.

Id. at273.
d)

In addition, the Tax Comi stated that the argument
that a DRO could cause HBW to be at risk for the
repayment ofLCL's recourse debt is "illogical"
because "a DRO is routinely inse1ied into a
partnership agreement to meet the substantial
economic effect requirements of section 704(b)."
Id. at 273. The Tax Comi concluded that, if a DRO
caused a pminer to be at risk, then the at-risk rules
would have little purpose because eve1y member of
a limited liability company would then be at risk
under section 465. Id. at 273-274. The Service
made the same argument in the Service Brief. The
regulations under section 704(b), however, provide
that partnership allocations can generally be
respected in the absence of a DRO if the pminership
agreement meets certain requirements. One of the
principal requirements is that the partnership
agreement includes a "qualified income offset"
provision, which has the effect of allocating items
of income to a partner to eliminate the partner's
negative capital account. Treas. Reg. § 1.704l(b)(2)(ii)(d). Contrary to the Tax Court's and the
Service's assertion, in our experience, most
partnership agreements do not include a DRO as a
boilerplate provision, but rather include a qualified
income offset provision.
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v.

Analysis of the Tax Court's Holding in Hubert II
a)

b)

As discussed above, the Tax Court in Hubert II
focused on the need for HBW's interest in LCL to
be liquidated in order to trigger HBW's obligation
to make an additional capital contribution pursuant
to the DRO. The court noted that "[t]he revised
operating agreement states that LCL shall be
liquidated upon is 'dissolution' and that dissolution
occurs 'only as provided by the Wyoming LLC
Act."' The court stated that, under Wyoming law, a
limited liability company is dissolved upon the
occurrence of any of the following events:
[i]

When the period fixed for the duration of the
limited liability company shall expire;

[ii]

By the unanimous written agreement of all
members; or

[iii]

Upon the death, retirement, resignation,
expulsion, bankruptcy, dissolution of a
member or occunence of any other event
which terminates the continued membership
of a member in the limited liability
company, unless the business of the limited
liability company is continued by the
consent of all the remaining members under
a right to do so stated in the articles of
organization of the limited liability
company. T.C. Memo 2008-46 at footnote
7.

The Tax Court reasoned that, because none of these
three events would necessarily occur upon LCL' s
default on the payment of a debt, a creditor of LCL
could not force the liquidation ofHBW's
membership interest in LCL or of LCL itself. The
court stated that "LCL could not be made to
liquidate by a creditor in any circumstance, not even
by a creditor that forced LCL into receivership or
bankruptcy." Id. at footnote 6. The court
concluded that HBW therefore could not be the
payor of last resort because HBW would simply
choose not to liquidate its membership interest in
order to avoid any payment obligations with respect
to the DRO.
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It is not self-evident to us that the Tax Court's statement
that even a creditor who forced LCL into bankmptcy or
receivership could not compel a liquidation, because
Federal bankmptcy law and presumably Wyoming
receivership law would "tmmp" the provisions ofLCL's
operating agreement. Moreover, the regulations under
section 704(b), which include provisions related to deficit
restoration obligations of partners, provide that a
liquidation of a partner's interest in a pmtnership occurs
upon the earlier of ( 1) the date upon which there is a
liquidation of the pmtnership, or (2) the date upon which
there is a liquidation of the partner's interest in the
partnership under Treas. Reg. § 1.761-1(d). Treas. Reg. §
1.704-1(b)(2)(g). The regulations further provide that "the
liquidation of a pmtnership occurs upon the earlier of (3)
the date upon which the pmtnership is terminated under
section 708(b)(1 ), or (4) the date upon which the
partnership ceases to be a going concem (even though it
may continue in existence for the purpose of winding up its
affairs, paying its debts, and distributing any remaining
balance to its partners)." 12 It is not clear whether the DRO
in LCL' s partnership agreement is triggered upon a
liquidation of LCL under state law or upon a liquidation
within the meaning of the section 704(b) regulations. In
our experience, the obligation to make a payment under a
DRO is typically tied to a liquidation of a partnership
within the meaning of the section 704(b) regulations. In
that case, the Tax Court's concem that a creditor could not
force a liquidation of LCL under Wyoming law such that
HBW could simply avoid its DRO obligation by not
causing a liquidation of its interest or LCL may be
misplaced. Under the section 704(b) regulations, HBW's
interest in LCL may be deemed liquidated even if LCL has
not liquidated under Wyoming law.

12

Treas. Reg. § 1.708-1(b)(1) provides that "a partnership shall tenninate when the
operations of the partnership are discontinued and no part of any business, financial operation, or
venture of the partnership continues to be carried on by any of its partners in a partnership." For
additional analysis of when a partnership terminates under section 708, see Blake D. Rubin and
Steven B. Teplinsky, "A Comprehensive Guide to Partnership Terminations, Including the
Impact of the New Proposed Regulations," 24 Joumal of Real Estate Taxation No.2 (Winter
1997), and Andrea M. Whiteway and James E. Wriggelswmth, "Planning with and Around the
Partnership Termination Rules," 65 N.Y.U. Federal Tax Institute Ch. 8 (2007).

42

c)

In addition, even if the DRO contained in LCL's
operating agreement requires a state law liquidation
of the entity in order to be triggered, we continue to
believe that the fact that a DRO does not become
operative until the member's interest in the entity is
liquidated should not preclude a finding that the
DRO increases the member's at-risk amount prior
to liquidation. As we have previously argued, in
detetmining whether a member of a limited liability
company is at risk under section 465 for a state law
recourse liability, we believe the Tax Court should
have adopted an approach similar to that contained
in the regulations under section 7 52 with respect to
the allocation of partnership recourse liabilities. As
discussed below, these regulations allocate
partnership recourse debt to the partner that bears
the economic risk of loss for the debt.

d)

Section 465- Generally
[i]

Section 465(a) generally provides that, in
the case of an individual and cetiain closely
held corporations, any loss from an activity
for the taxable year shall be allowed only to
the extent of the aggregate amount with
respect to which the taxpayer is at risk at the
close of the taxable year. Section 465(e)(l)
provides that if a taxpayer's at-risk amount
is reduced below zero then losses previously
allowed for a taxable year to which the mles
apply are recaptured to the extent of the
negative amount.

[ii]

Section 465(b) provides that a taxpayer is
considered at risk to the extent of any money
contributed to an activity by the taxpayer,
and with respect to any money borrowed by
the taxpayer to be used in the activity, to the
extent that the taxpayer is personally liable
for repayment, subject to cetiain exceptions.
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.465-6(d) provides that
if a taxpayer guarantees repayment of an
amount borrowed by another person for use
in an activity, the guarantee does not
increase the taxpayer's at-risk amount. If
the taxpayer repays to the creditor the
amount borrowed by the primary obligor,
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the taxpayer's at-risk amount is increased
when the taxpayer has no remaining legal
rights against the primmy obligor. In
contrast, Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.465-24
provides that, when a partnership incurs a
state law recourse liability, each partner's atrisk amount is increased to the extent the
partner is not protected against loss. Under
this proposed regulation, the increase in the
partner's at-risk amount is effective prior to
the time the partner makes any actual
payments with respect to the debt. These
proposed regulations, which were proposed
in 1979, were never adopted as final
regulations.
[iii]

The case law analyzing the application of
section 465 to partnerships generally follows
the approach of Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.46524 in that it allows a pattner's at-risk amount
to be increased prior to the time the partner
makes an actual payment. In Abramson v.
Commissioner, 86 T.C. 360 (1986), the
limited partners of a partnership guaranteed
the nonrecourse debt of the partnership. The
Tax Court held that the each of the limited
pattners could increase their bases in the
pattnership by the amount of the
partnership's nonrecourse debt guaranteed
by each partner, notwithstanding the fact
that the limited partners may never actually
make a payment under their guarantees.
Specifically, the Tax Court stated that:
[t]he guarantee of an
otherwise nonrecourse note
places each guaranteeing
partner in an economic
position indistinguishable
from that of a general pattner
with liability under a recourse
note except that the
guaranteeing partner's
liability is limited to the
amount guaranteed.... Each
is obligated to use his
personal assets to satisfy pro
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rata the partnership liability..
. Economic reality dictates
that [the general partner and
limited partners] be treated
equally, and we so hold.

Abramson, 86 T.C. at 374.
[iv]

Further, the Tax Court held that, because the
limited partners were personally and directly
liable for the partnership's nomecourse debt,
the limited partners were at risk for such
amount under section 465. Thus, the Tax
Court concluded that the guarantee
increased the guaranteeing partners at-risk
amount even though the guarantee had not
yet been called and the guaranteeing
partners had not yet made any payment.

[v]

Similarly, in Gefen v. Commissioner, 87
T.C. 1471 (1986), a limited partner in a
partnership engaged in a computer
equipment leasing business guaranteed a
recourse debt of the partnership and was
obligated under the partnership agreement to
make a "special contribution," equal to the
limited partner's payment obligation under
the guarantee, to the partnership in the event
of a default by the partnership under the
recourse liability. The limited partner had
no right to reimbursement from either the
partnership or the general partners for any
amount paid by the limited partner with
respect to the guarantee or the special
contribution obligation. The Tax Court held
that the limited partner could include the
guaranteed amount of the partnership's
recourse debt in her basis under section 752.
In addition, the Tax Court stated that
petitioner was not a mere
guarantor of her pro rata
portion of the Partnership's
recourse indebtedness, but
was ultimately liable for it,
because there was no primary
obligor against whom she had
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a remedy to recover amounts
paid by her to Sun Life
pursuant to the Limited
Partner Guarantee or to the
Partnership as a Special
Contribution .... Petitioner
was therefore at risk within
the meaning of section 465
for the full amount of her pro
rata share of the Partnership's
recourse indebtedness to Sun
Life.

Gefen, 87 T.C. at 1500-1501.
[vi]

In Melvin v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 63
(1987), aff'd, 894 F. 2d 1072, 65 AFTR2d
90-508 (9th Cir. 1990), the Tax Court stated
that "[i]t cannot seriously be questioned that
debt obligations of a pmtnership that are
payable in later years generally are to be
included in the at-risk amounts of the
partners that are personally liable therefore.
Sec. 465(b)(2)(A). The proposed
regulations under section 465 and final
regulations under section 752 contemplate
that obligations due in later years will be
included in the computation of a partner's
at-risk amount and in the computation of his
basis." Melvin, 88 T.C. at 73. The Tax
Comt further explained that, in determining
whether a pattner is at risk for a partnership
liability, "[t]he relevant question is who, if
anyone, will ultimately be obligated to pay
the pmtnership's recourse obligations if the
partnership is unable to do so. It is not
relevant that the pa1tnership may be able to
do so. The scenario that controls is the
worst-case scenario, not the best case ...
The critical inquily should be who is the
obligor oflast resort .... " Id. at 75.

[vii]

InPritchettv. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 581
(1985), rev'd and remanded, 827 F.2d 644
(9th Cir. 1987), a limited partnership
executed a recourse note in connection with
a turnkey drilling agreement. The general
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partners were personally liable under the
note. The limited partnership agreement,
however, provided that, in the event the note
was not paid in full at maturity, the limited
partners would be personally obligated, if
called upon by the general partners, to make
additional capital contributions to the
partnership sufficient to repay the note in
full. The Tax Comi found that the limited
partners incuned no personal liability to the
creditor as a result of their capital
contribution obligations and that the limited
partners' obligations were contingent on a
default on the note and on a cash capital call
by the general partners. As a result, the Tax
Comi held that the limited partners were not
at risk with respect to the recourse note
under section 465. Pritchett, 85 T.C. at 589.
While the Ninth Circuit agreed that the
limited partners were not personally liable to
the creditor, the Ninth Circuit reversed the
Tax Court, holding that the critical inquiry
under section 465 is who is the obligor of
last resmi. The Ninth Circuit found that the
limited partners' capital contribution
obligations under the partnership agreement
made them ultimately responsible for the
debt, and, in accordance with Melvin, that
"economic reality" dictated that the general
partners would make the cash capital calls if
the partnership's assets were insufficient to
satisfy the debt. Pritchett, 827 F.2d at 647.
[viii]
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Finally, in Pledger v. Commissioner, 236 F.
3d 315 (6th Cir. 2000), a case decided in the
same Federal appellate circuit as Hubert, the
taxpayer purchased an interest in a trust
fmmed by a corporation ("Corporation A")
that had purchased satellite transponders
pursuant to a three-patty sale-leaseback
transaction. Corporation A was a brothersister corporation to the lessee of the
transponders under a master-lease
agreement. Corporation A transfened its
interest in the transponders to the trust and
offered units in the trust to third-party
investors, including the taxpayer. In

connection with the taxpayer's purchase of
an interest in the trust, the taxpayer gave a
promiss01y note to Corporation A, pursuant
to which the taxpayer agreed to pay its pro
rata share of the payments due from
Corporation A to the lessee. The payments
due to the lessee from Corporation A were
equal to the payments due from the lessee to
the trust under the master lease. The
payments received by the trust from the
lessee were applied to satisfy the payments
the taxpayer was required to make under the
promissory note. In addition, the lessee's
obligations under the lease were guaranteed
by the lessee's and Corporation A's parent
corporation ("Parent"). The Sixth Circuit
found that Corporation A was a mere
instrumentality of Parent and that Parent was
both the guarantor and payee under the saleleaseback arrangement. As a result, the
Sixth Circuit held that the taxpayer was not
at risk with respect to the promissory note
because, even if the lessee became insolvent,
the taxpayer's obligations under the
promissory note would be cancelled out by
Parent's guaranty oflessee's obligations.
The Sixth Circuit explained that it applies
the "payor of last resort" test to determine
whether a taxpayer will suffer an economic
loss with respect to a transaction. Similar to
the analysis applied in Abramson, Gefen,
Melvin, and Pritchett, under this test the
Sixth Circuit "asks whether, in a worst case
scenario, the individual taxpayer will suffer
any personal, out-of-pocket expenses."
Pledger, 236 F.3d at 319.
[ix]
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Thus, provided that the taxpayer is the
obligor of last resort in a worst-case scenario
in the event funds generated in the activity
are insufficient to repay the debt, and has no
rights of indemnification, contribution or
subrogation against any other person, the
taxpayer is at risk for the amount of the debt.
See also Whitmire v. Commissioner, 178
F.3d 1050, 1053 (9 1h Cir. 1999) (stating that,
for purposes of section 465, a taxpayer is

personally liable for a liability if the
"taxpayer would legally be responsible for
his debt under a worst-case scenario" (citing
American Principals Leasing Corporation v.
United States, 904 F.2d 477, 482 (9 111 Cir.
1990))); Tepper v. Commissioner, 62 T.C.M.
505, 509 (1991), (holding that a taxpayer is
personally liable for the repayment of an
amount under section 465(b)(2)(A) if the
taxpayer has ultimate liability to repay the
debt obligation); FSA 200025018 (March
17, 2000) (concluding that a member of a
limited liability company that guaranteed a
lease obligation of the limited liability
company should be considered at risk with
respect to such liability under section 465
because "[a] partner who, through a
contractual obligation, has ultimate
responsibility for the debt is at-risk with
respect to such amount").
e)

Risk of Loss Under Section 752 Regulations
[i]

Similar to section 465, section 752(a)
provides that a partnership liability is a
recourse liability to the extent that any
partner or related person 13 bears the
"economic risk of loss" for that liability
under the deemed liquidation analysis
described above.

[ii]

Accordingly, like section 465, the section
752 regulations employ a worst-case
scenario approach to determine whether a
partner is "at risk" with respect to a
partnership recourse liability. In fact, in the
past, the Service has acknowledged that the
recourse debt allocation rules under section

13

Treas. Reg. § 1. 7 52-4(b) generally provides that a person is related to a partner if the
person and partner bear a relationship to each other that is specified in section 267(b) or section
707(b)(1), subject to the following modifications: (1) substitute "80 percent or more" for "more
than 50 percent" each place it appears in those sections; (2) a person's family is determined by
excluding brothers and sisters; and (3) disregard section 267(e)(l) and section 267(f)(l)(A).
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752 should be applied to determine a
partner's at-risk amount with respect to such
liabilities under section 465. See FSA 0293
(December 15, 2003) (concluding that
liability assumption agreements entered into
by limited partners of a partnership caused
the partners to have DROs that increased the
partners' bases in their partnership interests
under section 752(a) and increased their atrisk amounts under section 465); FSA 0623
(June 21, 1993) (concluding that limited
partners' conditional obligations to make
additional capital contributions in the event
the partnership is unable to meet its debt
service obligations increase the limited
partners' bases under section 752(a) and
their at-risk amounts under section 465 and
stating that, "the likelihood that the call will
be made or repaid is not the standard under
section 465 ... [r]ather, the test is whether,
under a worst case scenario analysis, the
partner will ultimately be liable"); Priv. Ltr.
Rul. 9036013 (applying the economic risk of
loss analysis under the temporary
regulations under section 752 to determine a
partner's at-risk amount under section 465).
[iii]
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In addition, the section 752 regulations
provide that, in determining whether a
partner or related person has an obligation to
make a payment in the event of a deemed
liquidation of the partnership as described
above, all statutory and contractual
obligations relating to the partnership
liability are taken into account, including
obligations to the partnership that are
imposed by the partnership agreement, such
as the obligation to make a capital
contribution and to restore a deficit capital
account upon liquidation of the partnership.
As we have previously discussed, a DRO
should generally be effective to cause a
limited partner to bear the economic risk of
loss within the meaning of the section 752
regulations with respect to a recourse debt of
a limited partnership. In contrast, whether a
member of a limited liability company is

deemed to bear the economic risk of loss for
a recourse debt of a limited liability
company may depend on whether a member
has a positive or negative "book" capital
account with respect to their membership
interest in the limited liability company. See
Hubert Article 1 and Hubert Article 2,
supra.
f)

Vl.

Thus, we continue to believe that, consistent with
case law precedent under section 465, Prop. Treas.
Reg. § 1.465-24 and the section 752 regulations and
as a matter of sound tax policy, a DRO should
attract an allocation of pminership recourse debt
under section 752 and should also increase a
pminer's at-risk amount under section 465 to the
extent that the DRO would require the partner to
make a payment in the event of a deemed
liquidation. Unfortunately, however, the Tax Court
disagreed with this conclusion in Hubert II.

Conclusion
a)

In applying the "payor oflast resort" test as
mandated by the Sixth Circuit, we believe the Tax
Court should have determined whether the DRO
would have obligated the members ofLCL to make
a payment upon a constructive liquidation of LCL
under an analysis that is consistent with recourse
liability allocation methodology contained in the
regulations under section 752.

b)

In addition, as noted above, we believe the Tax
Court's emphasis on the inability of a creditor to
force a state law liquidation of LCL may have been
misplaced in light of the definition of the phrase
"liquidation of a partnership" in the section 704(b)
regulations.

c)

Although Hubert II involved the at-risk amounts of
members of a limited liability company, we believe
the Tax Court's holding applies equally to a limited
partnership.

d)

Accordingly, in light of Hubert II, it is inadvisable
for a limited liability company member or limited
partner to enter into a DRO to increase such
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member's or limited partner's at-risk amount under
section 465 with respect to a recourse liability.
i.

Example 9: Nomecourse Debt; Conventional DRO. The facts are
the same as the facts in Example 7, except that the debt is
nomecourse.
1.

3.

Tax Consequences. X's DRO will not cause $10 of debt to
be allocated to X. Upon a constmctive liquidation of the
partnership, the partnership would be deemed to dispose of
the Property in a fully taxable transaction for consideration
equal to the $100 nomecourse liability. The partnership
would recognize $20 of gain on the disposition. Under the
"minimum gain chargeback" requirement of the section
704(b) regulations, the $20 gain would be allocated $ .20 to
X and $19.80 to the other partners. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.704-2(£). After this allocation, X's capital
account would be $0. Because X would not have a deficit
capital account balance, the DRO would not apply.
Accordingly, X would not be required to make a capital
contribution to the partnership, and X would not bear the
economic risk of loss with respect to any portion of the
debt.

Managing Liability Allocations in Limited Liability Companies
a.

Characterization of a Recourse Liability of a Limited Liability
Company.
1.

A fundamental state law difference between LLCs that are
treated as partnerships for Federal income tax purposes and
patinerships is that, in an LLC, by operation of state law,
no member is liable for obligations of the LLC merely by
virtue of being a member in the LLC. In contrast, in a
partnership, a general partner is liable for debts of the
partnership unless the debt by its terms relieves the general
patiner from liability (i.e., the debt is nomecourse from a
state law perspective). This fundamental difference creates
important differences in the way the mles of section 752
apply to LLCs compared to partnerships.

ii.

Absent special circumstances, a liability that is recourse
from a state law perspective to an LLC nevertheless should
be treated as nomecourse for purposes of section 752. This
is because, by virtue of the liability shield that the LLC
provides, no member is personally obligated to pay the
liability. The creditor can reach any and all of the assets of
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the LLC, but if those assets are insufficient to pay the
liability, the creditor cannot pursue the members
personally.
111.

b.

Such a liability is much like a so-called "exculpatory
liability" in a partnership, i.e., a liability with respect to
which the creditor can reach all assets of the patinership but
with respect to which all partners are exculpated from
personal liability. See T.D. 8385, 1992-1 C.B. 199.
Guarantee

1.

Recourse Liability. A recourse liability of an LLC should
be treated as nonrecourse for section 752 purposes. As is
the case with respect to nonrecourse liabilities of
partnerships, an enforceable guarantee ("bottom" or
othetwise) of all or a portion of such liability, with waiver
of any right of subrogation, should cause the guaranteeing
member to bear the economic risk of loss for the
guaranteed portion. See discussion in Example 3, above.

11.

Nonrecourse Liability. A similar result should apply with
respect to a liability of an LLC that is nonrecourse under
state law (i.e., a liability with respect to which the lender's
right to enforce payment is limited to specified collateral).

c.

Deficit Restoration Obligation
1.

Recourse Debt. Whether a DRO attracts an allocation of
state law recourse debt for a member of an LLC may
depend on whether the member has a positive or negative
"book" capital account, as shown in Example 10 and
Example 11 below.
a)

Example 10- LLC Members with Negative Capital
Accounts. The facts are the same as the facts in
Example 7, except that the entity is an LLC rather
than a partnership.
[i]

Tax Consequences. X's DRO will not cause
$10 of debt to be allocated to X. Upon a
constructive liquidation of a partnership,
Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-l(b)(l)(iii) specifies that
"[t]he partnership disposes of all of its
property in a fully taxable transaction for no
consideration (except relief from liabilities
for which the creditor's right to repayment is
limited solely to one or more assets of the
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partnership.)" In the case of state law
recourse debt of an LLC, the creditor's right
to repayment is not limited to a specified
subset ofLLC assets; rather, the creditor
may pursue all assets of the partnership but
may not enforce the debt against the
members personally. Nevertheless, the
creditor's right to repayment is limited
"solely to one or more assets of the
partnership" because that phrase
encompasses the situation where the
creditor's right to repayment is limited to all
assets of the LLC.
[ii]

b)

Thus, upon a constructive liquidation, the
LLC would be deemed to dispose of the
Property in a fully taxable transaction for
consideration equal to the $100 liability.
The LLC would recognize $20 of gain on
the disposition. Under the "minimum gain
chargeback" requirement of the section
704(b) regulations, the $20 gain would be
allocated$ .20 to X and $19.80 to the other
members. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-2(f).
After this allocation, X' s capital account
would be $0. Because X would not have a
deficit capital account balance, the DRO
would not apply. Accordingly, X would not
be obligated to make a capital contribution
to the LLC, and X would not bear the
economic risk of loss with respect to any
portion of the debt. 14

Example 11 - LLC Members with Positive Capital
Accounts. The facts are the same as the facts in
Example 10, except the "book" balance sheet of the
LLC is as follows:

14

See generally Stan, Case, Gane-Lohnes, Rosenberg, Schmalz, 725-2nd T.M., Limited
Liability Companies, Section IV.B.2.b.(3) ("It is unclear whether a DRO shifts economic risk of
loss for an LLC's recourse debt ... ").
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Property 120

100 Liability
.20
19.80

X
Other Partners

[i]

Tax Consequences. For the reasons
discussed in Example 11, upon a
constructive liquidation, the LLC would be
deemed to dispose of the Property in a fully
taxable transaction for consideration equal
to the $100 liability. The LLC would
recognize $20 of loss on the disposition. Of
this amount, $10.20 would be allocated to X
and the balance would be allocated to the
other partners. After these allocations, X
would have a deficit capital account of $10,
and would be required to contribute this
amount to the LLC. The other members
would have positive capital accounts of $10.
X' s $10 would either be distributed to the
other partners in liquidation or would be
paid to the creditor. See generally
Treas. Reg.§ 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(c), which
states that the proceeds of a DRO are to "be
paid to creditors of the partnership or
distributed to other partners in accordance
with their positive capital account balances."

[ii]

Note that under the language of the
constructive liquidation test, the assumption
that all assets of the LLC are worth zero
applies with respect to assets that are
presumed transferred to the creditor on
account of the debt. Thus, because the
creditor's rights are not extinguished, in
applying the constructive liquidation test the
creditor should be presumed to pursue the
$10.

[iii]

Regardless ofwhether the proceeds of the
$10 DRO are deemed to be distributed to the
other members or paid to creditors, because
X would be required to make a capital
contribution, X should bear the economic
risk of loss with respect to $10.
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Accordingly, $10 of the debt would be
allocated to X.
[iv]

d.

Note, however, that in order for a partner to
bear the economic risk of loss with respect
to a liability, Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(b)(1)
requires that the partner "be obligated to
make a payment to any person (or a
contribution to the partnership) because that
liability becomes due and payable .... " To
the extent that X's $10 capital contribution
would be distributed to other members
rather than paid to creditors, it is possible
that the Service would argue that this
requirement is not met.

Capital Contribution Obligation Tied to Value. In light of the
uncertainty as to whether a DRO will attract an allocation of state
law recourse debt for a member of an LLC, Example 12 illustrates
a better way to attract a debt allocation from an LLC.
i.

Example 12- LLC Member with Negative Capital
Account. Assume the same facts in Example 10, except
that instead of entering into a DRO, X agrees that, upon
liquidation of the LLC, to the extent that the fair market
value of the assets available to satisfy the $100 debt are less
than $10, X will make a capital contribution ofup to $10
itTespective of whether X has a deficit capital account
balance.
a)

Tax Consequences. X's capital contribution
obligation should cause $10 of the debt to be
allocated to X. As discussed in Example 10, upon a
constructive liquidation, the LLC would be deemed
to dispose of the Property in a fully taxable
transaction for consideration equal to the $100
liability. The LLC would recognize $20 of gain on
the disposition. Under the "minimum gain
chargeback" requirement of the section 704(b)
regulations, the $20 gain would be allocated $ .20 to
X and $19.80 to the other members. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.704-2(£). After this allocation, X's
capital account would be $0.

b)

Even though X would not have a deficit capital
account balance, X would be obligated to make a
capital contribution to the LLC.
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Treas. Reg. § 1. 752-2(b)(1 )(ii) specifies that, upon a
constmctive liquidation, "[w ]ith the exception of
property contributed to secure a partnership liability
(see§ 1.752-2(h)(2)) all of the partnership's assets,
including cash, have a value of zero .... " If the
Property were worth zero, X would be obligated to
make a $10 capital contribution to the LLC, and the
creditor would be able to recover this amount
(because the creditor would have recourse against
all assets of the LLC). Moreover,
Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(b)(3)(ii) specifies that, in
determining whether a partner bears the economic
risk of loss, obligations imposed by the patinership
agreement are taken into account, "including the
obligation to make a capital contribution and to
restore a deficit capital account upon liquidation ...
." [Emphasis added.] Accordingly, X bears the
economic risk of loss for $10 and is allocated $10 of
the debt.
C.

TREATMENT OF "NON-TAX BASIS" LIABILITIES: REG.§§ 1.752-6 AND
1.752-7
1.

Background. On June 23, 2003, the Service issued temporary and
proposed regulations addressing the treatment of cetiain contractual and
other obligations assumed by a partnership that historically have not been
treated as "liabilities" for purposes of section 752 and the regulations
thereunder. The proposed and temporary regulations were a response to
perceived abuses that originated in the corporate area but then migrated to
the patinership context.
a.

Corporate Abuse and Section 358(h)
1.

On December 21,2000, as part of the Community Renewal
Tax Relief Act of 2000 (the "Act"), Congress enacted
section 358(h) aimed at curbing the following perceived
abuse. A corporation would assume an obligation of a
taxpayer who took the position that the obligation was not a
liability within the meaning of section 357(c) and thus did
not reduce the taxpayer's basis in the stock of the
corporation. The transferor would then sell the stock of the
corporation for a low amount, reflecting the existence of
the obligation, and claim a loss, even though the taxpayer
had not incuned any conesponding economic loss. When
the corporation paid the obligation, it deducted the
payment. Thus, the transferor was able to effectively
duplicate a loss in corporate stock and accelerate
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deductions that are only allowed upon economic
performance of an obligation.
11.

b.

To prevent this perceived abuse, section 358(h)(l) provides
that after application of section 3 58(d), the basis in stock
received in an exchange to which section 351, 354, 355,
356, or 361 applies must be reduced (but not below the fair
market value of the stock) by the amount of any liability
assumed in the exchange. For this purpose, section
358(h)(3) defines the tenn "liability" to include any fixed
or contingent obligation to make payment without regard to
whether the obligation is othetwise taken into account for
purposes of the Code. Section 358(h)(2) provides
exceptions to the basis reduction requirement if: (1) the
trade or business with which the liability is associated is
transferred to the person assuming the liability as pali of
the exchange; or (2) substantially all of the assets with
which the liability is associated are transferred to the
person assuming the liability as part of the exchange.
Partnership Abuse

1.

The Service tried to prevent similar abuses in the
partnership context tln·ough the issuance of administrative
guidance. On September 5, 2000, the Service issued Notice
2000-44, 2000-2 C.B. 255, identifying the so-called "Son
ofBoss" transaction as a "listed transaction." The fact
pattern discussed in Notice 2000-44 involves a taxpayer
that contributes a purchased option to a partnership and
writes an option that is assumed by the partnership. The
taxpayer takes the position that its basis in its palinership
interest is increased by the cost of the purchased call option
but is not reduced under section 752 for the assumption of
the written call option obligation. Thereafter, upon a
disposition of the partnership interest for a low amount,
reflecting the existence of the written call option, the
taxpayer claims a loss even though the taxpayer has not
incurred any corresponding economic loss.

ii.

The taxpayer's position was based on the conclusion that
the obligation assumed does not constitute a liability for
purposes of section 752. Section 752(a) and (b) provide
that when a palinership assumes a liability from a paliner
or a paliner contributes property to a palinership subject to
a liability, the paliner will be treated as receiving a deemed
distribution of money from the palinership to the extent of
the difference between the amount of the liability and the
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partner's share of such liability after the partnership's
assumption of the liability. Pursuant to section 733, the
partner's basis in the partnership interest is reduced by the
amount of the deemed distribution of money, and pursuant
to section 731, the partner may recognize gain as a result of
the deemed distribution to the extent that it exceeds the
patiner's basis in the partnership interest.
111.

The Code does not contain a definition of "liability" for
purposes of section 752. However, case law and revenue
rulings generally have established that for this purpose, the
term "liability" includes an obligation only if and to the
extent that incurring the obligation creates or increases the
basis to the partnership of any of the partnership's assets
(including cash attributable to borrowings), gives rise to an
immediate deduction to the partnership, or, under section
705(a)(2)(B), currently decreases a partner's basis in the
partner's partnership interest. See Rev. Rul. 88-77, 1988-2
C.B. 128; Salina Partnership LP, FPL Group, Inc. v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2000-352. Thus, the te1m
"liability" for purposes of section 752 generally has not
included an obligation the payment of which would give
rise to a deduction.

IV.

During the course of enacting section 358(h) to preclude
the abuse in the corporate context, Congress became aware
that taxpayers were attempting to use partnerships to
engage in similarly abusive transactions. Accordingly, in
Section 309(c) of the Act, Congress directed the Secretary
to prescribe rules to provide "appropriate adjustments
under subchapter K of chapter 1 of the Code to prevent the
acceleration or duplication of losses through the
assumption of (or transfer of assets subject to) liabilities
described in section 358(h)(3) ... in transactions involving
partnerships." Section 358(h)(3) defines the term
"liability" to include any fixed or contingent obligation to
make payment without regard to whether the obligation is
othetwise taken into account for purposes of the Code. The
regulations issued pursuant to this directive are to apply to
assumptions of liabilities that occur after October 18, 1999,
or such later date as may be prescribed in the regulations.
Act Section 309(d)(2).

v.

In contrast to the corporate abuse targeted by section
358(h), in the partnership context, the duplication of the
loss may be viewed as only temporary. For example, if a
taxpayer transfers assets with an adjusted basis and fair
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market value of $100 to a partnership in exchange for a
partnership interest, and the partnership assumes a $40
liability that is not deductible until paid, the taxpayer's
interest in the partnership would have a value of $60 and a
basis of $100. Upon the sale of the partnership interest, the
taxpayer would claim a $40 loss, in effect accelerating the
deduction for the $40 liability. Assuming no election under
section 754 (note that these regulations were issued before
enactment of the Jobs Act provisions making certain
downward basis adjustments under section 743(b)
mandatmy), the partnership would continue to have a $100
adjusted basis in the contributed asset. If the partnership
thereafter satisfied the liability and allocated the $40
deduction to the purchaser, the loss would be duplicated.
The purchaser's adjusted basis in the partnership would
initially be its $60 purchase price, but would be reduced to
$20 by the $40 allocated deduction. Thus, if the
partnership was thereafter liquidated and the purchaser
received the $60 value of its partnership interest in cash,
the purchaser would recognize $40 of gain under section
731(a).
2.

The Final Regulations. On May 26, 2005, the Service issued final
regulations in response to the directive from Congress. The final
regulations generally follow the temporary and proposed regulations
issued on June 23, 2003, with certain modifications. In addition, the
Service issued regulations under section 358(h) for assumptions of
liabilities by corporations from partners and partnerships. These
regulations are intended to prevent the duplication and acceleration of
noneconomic tax losses resulting from Son of Boss and similar
transactions, but they sweep much more broadly.
a.

Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-6

i.

Treas. Reg. § 1.752-6 applies retroactively to transactions
occuning after October 18, 1999, and before June 24, 2003.
Treas. Reg. § 1.752-6 generally adopts the approach of
section 358(h) for transactions involving partnership
assumptions of partners' liabilities occuning during that
time window, but modifies the approach of section 358(h)
as necessary to apply the rules to partnerships instead of
corporations.

n.

Under Treas. Reg. § 1.752-6, if a partnership assumes a
liability of a partner (other than a liability to which section
752(a) and (b) apply) in a transaction described in section
72l(a), then, after application of section 752(a) and (b),
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there is an automatic reduction in the partner's basis in the
partnership (but not below the "adjusted value" of such
interest) by the amount (determined as of the date of the
exchange) of the liability.
111.

Treas. Reg. § 1. 7 52-6 defines "liability" consistently with
section 358(h) to include any fixed or contingent obligation
to make payment, without regard to whether the obligation
is otherwise taken into account for federal tax purposes.

1v.

Treas. Reg. § 1.752-6 defines the "adjusted value" of a
partner's interest in a partnership as the fair market value of
that interest increased by the partner's share of partnership
liabilities under Treas. Reg. §§ 1.752-1 through 1.752-5.

v.

Thus, under section 752(d), the "adjusted value" should
equal the amount that would be the partner's "amount
realized" under section 1001(b) if there were a taxable
disposition of the partnership interest immediately after the
assumption of the liability. As a result, if the partner sold
the interest immediately after the liability was assumed, no
loss could be recognized.

vi.

Treas. Reg. § 1.752-6 adopts by cross reference the
exceptions to the automatic basis reduction set forth under
section 358(h). Treas. Reg. § 1.752-6(b)(1). Thus, there is
no reduction in a partner's basis if: (1) the trade or business
with which the liability is associated is transferred to the
partnership assuming the liability as part of the transaction,
or (2) substantially all of the assets with which the liability
is associated are contributed to the partnership assuming
the liability. Section 358(h)(2).

vn.

b.

The temporary regulations provide that the exception for
contributions of substantially all of the assets with which
the liability is associated does not apply in the case of a
partnership transaction described in Notice 2000-44, or a
partnership transaction that is substantially similar to the
transactions described in Notice 2000-44. Treas. Reg. §
1.752-6(b)(2).
Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-7

1.

Treas. Reg. § 1. 7 52-7 generally applies prospectively to
transactions occurring after June 23, 2003, unless a
taxpayer to which Treas. Reg. § 1.752-6 would otherwise
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apply elects to apply the provisions ofTreas. Reg.§ 1.7527 to the transaction at issue.

ii.

Liability Defined. The regulations provide a definition of
"liability" for purposes of section 752 and provides that an
obligation is a liability if and to the extent that incuning the
obligation -a)

creates or increases the basis of any of the obligor's
assets (including cash);

b)

gives rise to an immediate deduction to the obligor;
or

c)

gives rise to an expense that is not deductible in
computing the obligor's taxable income and is not
properly chargeable to capital.

An "obligation" is any fixed or contingent obligation to
make payment without regard to whether the obligation is
otherwise taken into account for purposes of the Code.
Obligations include, but are not limited to, debt obligations,
envirollll1ental obligations, tort obligations, contract
obligations, pension obligations, obligations under a short
sale, and obligations under derivative fmancial instruments
such as options, forward contracts, and futures contracts.
Thus, an "obligation" the incunence of which creates or
increases basis, give rise to an immediate deduction or
gives rise to a non-deductible, non-capitalizable expense is
treated as a liability.
111.

Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-7 Liability. The regulations are
intended to prevent the acceleration or duplication of loss
through the assumption of obligations not described in
Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-l(a). The regulations refer to any such
obligation as a "Reg.§ 1.752-7liability" and to the partner
transfening such liability as a "Reg. § 1. 7 52-7 liability
partner." Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-7(b)(3) and (5). The final
regulations clarify that a liability can be a liability
described in Treas. Reg. § 1.752-l(a) in part and a Reg.
§ 1.752-7liabilityinpart. Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-7(b)(3).
Any person who acquires a partnership interest from a Reg.
§ 1. 7 52-7 liability partner in a transaction in which the
transferee's basis in the partnership interest is determined
in whole or in part by reference to the transferor's basis is
also a Reg. § 1.752-7liability partner. Treas. Reg. § 1.7527(b)(5); Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-7(e)(3).
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a)

The regulations do not explicitly address whether an
obligation under a short sale constitutes a liability or
a Reg. § 1. 752-7 liability. Arguably, the duty to
retum stock borrowed to consummate a short sale is
the "obligation" under the regulations and does not,
in and of itself, give rise to any cash proceeds or
basis in any property. Rather, the sale of the
borrowed stock gives rise to the cash proceeds but
is independent of the bonowing of the stock.
Nevertheless, prior to the issuance of the
regulations, Salina Partnership v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo 2000-352, held that a short sale gave
rise to a liability for purposes of section 752.
Moreover, the Service reached the same conclusion
in Rev. Rul. 95-26, 1995-1 C.B. 131, and informal
discussions with representatives of the Service who
were involved in the development of the regulations
indicate that a short sale is intended to give rise to a
liability in an amount equal to the cash proceeds
from the sale.

b)

The regulations also do not specifically address
whether a variable share prepaid forward contract is
a "liability" or even an "obligation." An example of
such an anangement is set forth in Rev. Rul. 20037, 2003-5 I.R.B. 363.
[i]

In that mling, Shareholder, an individual,
owned common stock of Y Corporation,
which was publicly traded. The shares had a
value of $20 per share and Shareholder's
basis was less than $20. Shareholder
entered into an arm's length agreement (the
"Agreement") with Investment Bank, and
received $z of cash upon execution of the
Agreement. In retum, Shareholder became
obligated to deliver to Investment Ban1c on
the third anniversary of the Agreement (the
"Exchange Date") a number of shares of
common stock ofY corporation to be
determined by formula. Under the formula,
if the market price of a share of Y
Corporation common stock is less than $20
on the Exchange Date, Investment Bank will
receive 100 shares of common stock. If the
market price of a share is at least $20 and no
more than $25 on the Exchange Date,
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Investment Banlc will receive a number of
shares having a total market value equal to
$2,000. If the market price of a share
exceeds $25 on the Exchange Date,
Investment Banlc will receive 80 shares of
common stock. In addition, Shareholder has
the right to deliver to Investment Bank on
the Exchange Date cash equal to the value of
the common stock that Shareholder would
otherwise be required to deliver under the
formula. In order to secure Shareholder's
obligations under the Agreement,
Shareholder pledged to Investment Banlc on
the Execution Date 100 shares (that is, the
maximum number of shares that
Shareholder could be required to deliver
under the Agreement). Shareholder retained
the right to vote the pledged shares and to
receive dividends. Shareholder also had the
umestricted legal right to deliver the pledged
shares, cash, or shares other than the
pledged shares to satisfy its obligation under
the Agreement.
[ii]

Rev. Rul. 2003-7 holds that the variable
share prepaid contract described therein
does not result in an immediate sale of the
stock for federal tax purposes, and also does
not result in a "constmctive sale" of the
stock under section 1259.

[iii]

Representatives of the Service who were
involved in the development of the new
regulations have indicated that, in their
view, a variable prepaid forward contract
like that described in Rev. Rul. 2003-7 gives
rise to a "liability" in an amount equal to the
cash proceeds received. In addition, as the
date for delivery of the stock approaches and
the present value of the obligation to deliver
the stock exceeds the cash received under
the contract, a Reg.§ 1.752-7liability comes
into existence. The amount of the Reg. §
1. 7 52-7 liability may also be affected by
changes in the value of the stock.
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Clearly, application of this analysis to specific
variable share prepaid forward contracts (which
have become commonplace enough to merit the
Service's issuance ofRev. Rul. 2003-7) will be
fraught with complexity and uncertainty.
IV.

Timing ofBasis Reduction. Unlike Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-6,
Treas. Reg. § 1. 7 52-7 does not adopt the approach set forth
in section 358(h), i.e. immediate reduction in the
transferor's basis. Rather, in the preamble to the proposed
regulations, the Service noted that it "do[ es] not believe
that this is the best approach for partnerships given their
passthrough nature." In explaining this position, the
Service noted that the partners' shares of a partnership's
deductions are limited by the partners' outside bases in
their partnership interests. Thus, if, at the time of an
assumption by a partnership of a Reg. § 1.752-7 liability,
the Reg. § 1. 7 52-7 liability partner's outside basis were
reduced by the amount of the Reg. § 1. 7 52-7 liability, then
the Reg. § 1. 7 52-7 liability partner would not have
sufficient outside basis to absorb any deduction with
respect to the Reg. § 1. 7 52-7 liability that passed through
the partnership. Thus, the regulations do not adopt an
approach that would reduce the Reg. § 1. 752-7 liability
partner's outside basis immediately upon assumption by the
partnership.

v.

Treatment of Reg. § 1.752-7 Liability as Section 704(c)
Built-in Loss Item. Under the methodology adopted in the
regulations, if the partnership satisfies the Reg. § 1.752-7
liability while the Reg. § 1. 752-7 liability partner is a
partner in the partnership, then the deduction with respect
to the portion of the Reg. § 1.752-7 liability assumed by the
partnership is allocated to the Reg.§ 1.752-7liability
patiner under section 704(c)(l)(A) principles, reducing that
partner's outside basis. Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-7(c). Thus, the
Reg.§ 1.752-7liability is treated under section 704(c)
principles as having a built-in loss equal to the amount of
such liability at the time of its assumption by the
partnership.
a)

The final regulations clarify that, if the value of a
Reg.§ 1.752-7liability decreases after the
assumption of the obligation by the partnership, the
"ceiling rule" applies, and the partnership and the
partners are entitled to adopt one of the section
704(c) methods to conect the ceiling rule disparity.
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Thus, well drafted partnership agreements will need
to specify the section 704(c) method to be used with
respect to Reg. § 1.752-7 liabilities, and will also
need to treat any "savings" realized in satisfying
Reg. § 1. 7 52-7 liabilities as "book" income. In
addition, the partners will need to negotiate over the
allocation of the "book" income that reflects the
"savings" realized on satisfaction of any Reg. §
1. 7 52-7 liability.
[i]

Example 13. X contributes property to a
partnership subject to an enviromnental
liability that constitutes a Reg.§ 1.752-7
liability. At the time of the contribution, X
and the other partners of the partnership
properly estimate that the resolution of the
liability will cost $100. In accordance with
the regulations, X's capital account credit is
equal to the value of the contributed
property, reduced by the $100 Reg.§ 1.7527 liability. X is generally allocated 10% of
all partnership profits and losses.
Thereafter, the partnership succeeds in
resolving the environmental problem for
only $80.

[ii]

The regulations require that the Reg. §
1. 7 52-7 liability be treated under section
704( c) principles as having a built-in loss
equal to the amount ofthe Reg.§ 1.752-7
liability as of the date of the partnership's
assumption, i.e., a built-in loss of $100.
Presumably, X should be treated in the same
manner as if X had contributed built-in loss
property to the partnership with an adjusted
basis of $100 and a value of $0. If X had
done so and the property were thereafter
sold for $20, the partnership would have a
"book" gain of $20 and a tax loss of $80.
The entire $80 tax loss would be allocated to
X under section 704(c). Ten percent of the
"book" gain ($2) would be allocated under
section 704(b) to X, and the balance ($18)
would be allocated to the other partners. A
"ceiling mle" problem would result, and
under the "traditional method" of Treas.
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Reg.§ 1.704-3(b), X would be allocated
only the $80 tax loss.
[iii]

VL

If, however, the partnership elected to
employ the "remedial allocation method" of
Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(d), the other partners
in the partnership would be allocated
remedial taxable gain equal to their "book"
gain of $18, and X would be allocated
remedial taxable loss in an offsetting
amount. Thus, under the remedial allocation
method, X's total deductible loss would be
$98, compared to $80 under the traditional
method.

"Separation Events" Triggering Basis Reduction. \
a)

The regulations provide that if one of three
"separation events" occurs prior to satisfaction of
the Reg. § 1.752-7 liability that has the effect of
separating the Reg. § 1. 752-7 liability partner from
the Reg.§ 1.752-7liability, then there is a basis
reduction in the Reg. § 1.752-7 liability patiner's
outside basis. The three events identified as giving
rise to the basis reduction are as follows: (1) a
disposition (or partial disposition) of the partnership
interest by the Reg. § 1. 752-7 liability partner, (2) a
liquidation ofthe Reg.§ 1.752-7liabilitypartner's
partnership interest, and (3) the assumption (or
partial assumption) of the Reg. § 1.752-7 liability
by a partner other than the Reg. § 1.752-7 liability
partner. Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-7(d) through (g). The
basis reduction resulting from any of these events is
deemed to occur immediately prior to the event.

b)

The Reg.§ 1.752-7liabilitypartner's outside basis
is reduced by the lesser of: (1) the excess of the
Reg.§ 1.752-7liability partner's outside basis in its
partnership interest over the adjusted value of that
interest, or (2) the remaining built-in loss associated
with the Reg.§ 1.752-7liability.

c)

In the case of a partial disposition of the Reg. §
1.752-7liability partner's partnership interest or a
partial assumption of the Reg. § 1.752-7 liability by
another partner, the Reg. § 1.752-7liability
reduction is pro rated based on the portion of the
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interest sold or the portion of the Reg. § 1. 752-7
liability assumed. Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-7(b)(6)(ii).
vn.

Economic Perfmmance of Reg. § 1.752-7 Liability After a
"Separation Event"
a)

After the occurrence of a separation event that
triggers a basis reduction, the partnership or the
assuming partner, as the case may be, is not entitled
to any deduction or capital expense on the
satisfaction of the Reg. § 1. 7 52-7 liability to the
extent of the remaining built-in loss associated with
the Reg.§ 1.752-71iability.

b)

The partnership, or the assuming partner as the case
may be, may notify the Reg. § 1.752-7 liability
partner of its satisfaction of the Reg. § 1.752-7
liability, in which case the Reg. § 1. 7 52-7 liability
pminer is entitled to a deduction or loss. Treas.
Reg.§ 1.752-7(h).

c)

In the case of a complete satisfaction, the amount of
the deduction or loss is equal to the remaining Reg
§ 1. 7 52-7 liability reduction. In the case of a pmiial
satisfaction, the amount of the deduction or loss is
equal to the amount paid by the partnership in
satisfaction of the Reg. § 1. 7 52-7 liability (but not
more than the Reg. § 1.752-7 liability reduction).

d)

The character of such deduction or loss is
determined as if the Reg. § 1. 7 52-7 liability partner
had satisfied the Reg.§ 1.752-7 liability. Ifthe
Reg. § 1. 7 52-7 liability reduction exceeds the
amount paid in satisfaction of the Reg.§ 1.752-7
liability, then as to such excess the character of the
Reg. § 1. 7 52-7 liability partner's loss is capital.

e)

In the event that the Reg. § 1.752-71iability is
assumed by a partner other than the Reg.§ 1.752-7
liability pminer, then, upon ultimate satisfaction of
the Reg. § 1.752-7 liability, the assuming partner
must adjust the basis of its pa1inership interest, any
assets distributed by the partnership to such partner,
or gain or loss on disposition of its partnership
interest, as the case may be. The adjustment is
made as if the assuming partner's basis in its
interest at the time of the assumption were increased
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by the lesser of: ( 1) the amount paid to satisfy the
Reg. § 1.752-7 liability; or (2) the remaining builtin loss associated with the Reg. § 1. 7 52-7 liability
as of the time of the assumption. Treas. Reg. §
1.752-7(g)(4). In making such adjustment the
assuming partner cannot take into account any
adjustments to depreciable basis, reduction in gain,
or increase in loss until satisfaction of the Reg. §
1.752-7liability. Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-7(g)(4).
vm.

Exceptions to Basis Reduction Rules. There are two
exceptions that apply to the general basis reduction rules
discussed above.
a)

The first exception applies where the partnership
assumes the Reg.§ 1.752-7liability as part of the
contribution of the trade or business with which the
liability is associated and the partnership continues
to conduct that trade or business after the
contribution. The regulations define a trade or
business as a specific group of activities canied on
by a person for the purpose of eaming income or
profit if the activities included in that group include
every operation that forms a part of, or a step in, the
process of eaming income or profit. Treas. Reg. §
1.752-7(d)(2)(i)(A); Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-7(b)(10).
The definition provides that a group of activities
ordinarily includes the collection of income and the
payment of expenses. Thus, the holding of rental
property would presumably satisfy this definition.
Because of concems that certain activities involving
financial instruments could be structured to
accomplish the types of transactions that the new
rules are designed to prevent, the regulations
provide that the activity of acquiring, holding, or
disposing of financial instruments does not
constitute a trade or business.

b)

A second exception is a de minimis exception that
is not present in section 358(h). Under this
exception, the regulations do not apply where,
immediately before a "separation event" that would
otherwise trigger a basis reduction, the remaining
built-in loss with respect to all Reg.§ 1.752-7
liabilities assumed by the patinership (other than
Reg. § 1.752-7liabilities that are assumed by the
partnership with an associated trade or business) is

69

less than the lesser of 10% of the gross value of the
partnership's assets or $1,000,000.
1x.

Coordination With Other Provisions
a)

The proposed regulations provided that the
assumption of a Reg. § 1.752-7 liability is not
treated as an assumption of a liability or as a
transfer of cash for purposes of the partnership
disguised sale mles of section 707(a)(2)(B). Prop.
Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-7(a)(2).

b)

This would have represented a change compared to
the provisions of the existing regulations under the
partnership disguised sale mles, which generally
provide that recourse and nonrecourse liabilities for
purposes of those mles include both amounts that
constitute recourse and nonrecourse liabilities under
Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-1 and also amounts that would
be treated as recourse and nonrecourse liabilities
under those sections if they were treated as
partnership liabilities for purposes of section 752.
Treas. Reg. § 1.707-5(a)(2).

c)

In response to comments on this provision, the final
regulations delete the language contained in Prop.
Treas. Reg. § 1.752-7(a)(2).

d)

The final regulations attempt to conform these
provisions with the section 704(b) regulations by
amending Treas. Reg. § 1.704-l(b)(2)(iv)(b) to
provide that a partner's capital account will be
reduced by the Treas. Reg. § 1.752-7 liabilities that
the partnership assumes from the partner and by
amending Treas. Reg. § 1.704-2(b)(3) to treat a
Treas. Reg. § 1.752-7 liability as a nonrecourse
liability for purposes of the partnership allocation
mles.

e)

The treatment ofthe Reg.§ 1.752-7liabilities as
nonrecourse liabilities for purpose of the section
704(b) regulations is not explained in the proposed
regulations, the final regulations or their preambles,
nor are the implications of such treatment illustrated
by any example. Presumably, such treatment
invokes the whole panoply of mles under the
section 704(b) regulations regarding nonrecourse
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deductions and minimum gain chargebacks. The
conceptual underpinning for this treatment seems
dubious at best in cases where the Reg. § 1.752-7
liability is not nonrecourse as a matter of state law.
f)

c.

The final regulations clarify that, in determining if a
deemed contribution of assets and assumption of
liability as a result of a technical termination under
section 708(b)(1 )(B) is treated as a transfer of a
Reg. § 1.752-7 liability that is subject to Treas. Reg.
§ 1.752-7, only liabilities that were Reg.§ 1.752-7
liabilities of the terminating partnership are taken
into account and, then, only to the extent of the
amount of the liability that was subject to Treas.
Reg.§ 1.752-7 prior to the technical termination.

Treas. Reg.§ 1.358-7. In connection with the issuance of final
regulations under section 752, the Service also issued regulations
under section 358(h) regarding the assumption ofliabilities by
corporations from partners or partnerships. These provisions are
effective for assumptions of liabilities by a corporation occurring
on or after June 24, 2003.
1.

Treas. Reg. § 1.358-7(a) provides that, for purposes of
section 358(h), a transfer of a partnership interest to a
corporation is treated as a transfer of the partner's share of
each of the partnership's assets and an assumption by the
corporation of the partner's share of partnership liabilities,
including section 358(h) liabilities. Section 358(h)
liabilities are liabilities described in section 358(h)(3),
which includes any fixed or contingent obligation to make
payment, without regard to whether the obligation is
othetwise taken into account.

ii.

Treas. Reg.§ 1.358-7(b) provides that if a corporation
assumes a section 358(h) liability from a partnership in an
exchange to which section 358(a) applies, then, for
purposes of determining the basis of the partners' interests
in the partnership under section 705 and Treas. Reg. §
1.704-l(b), any reduction, under section 358(h)(l), in the
partnership's basis in corporate stock received in the
transaction is treated as an expenditure of the partnership
described in section 705(a)(2)(B). The final regulations
provide that this expenditure must be allocated among the
partners in accordance with section 704(b) and (c) and
Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-7(c). !fa partner's share ofthe
reduction, under section 358(h)(l), in the partnership's
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basis in corporate stock exceeds the partner's basis in the
partnership interest, then the partner generally recognizes
gain equal to the excess, which is treated as gain from the
sale or exchange of a patinership interest.
111.

D.

CONCLUSION
1.

III.

Treas. Reg.§ 1.358-7(c) provides that, where a patinership
assumes a section 358(h) liability from a patiner and,
subsequently, the partner transfers all or part of the
partner's partnership interest to a corporation in an
exchange to which section 358(a) applies, then, for
purposes of applying section 358(h)(2), the section 358(h)
liability is treated as associated only with the contribution
made to the partnership by that partner.

Through careful crafting of guarantees, indemnities, deficit restoration
obligations and capital contribution obligations, partnership and limited
liability company liability allocations may be managed in a way that
preserves the desired share of the liability while minimizing the taxpayer's
economic exposure.

PROPOSED PARTNERSHIP LIABILITY REGULATIONS
A.

15

INTRODUCTION
1.

On January 29, 2014, Treasury and the Service issued far-reaching and
extremely taxpayer-adverse proposed regulations addressing the allocation
of partnership recourse and nonrecourse liabilities under section 752. 15
Among other things, the proposed regulations specify that so-called
bottom guarantees will not increase the guaranteeing patiner' s share of
partnership liabilities. The proposed regulations have the potential to
trigger gain for many patiners with negative tax basis capital accounts or
limit a partner's ability to take losses into account. 16

2.

The proposed regulations will apply prospectively from the date they are
published in final fonn. They provide for a seven-year transition period

REG-119305-11.

16

The proposed regulations also include changes to the partnership disguised sale mles under
section 707, which generally are not problematic. The proposed changes to the section 707
regulations are beyond the scope of this outline.
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during which some obligations may still be taken into account under the
existing partnership recourse debt allocation mles.

B.

3.

It is widely understood that the original motivation for changing the
section 752 regulations was to limit taxpayers' ability to stmcture a
leveraged partnership transaction that complies with the debt-financed
distribution exception to the partnership disguised sale mles under section
707. 17 The proposed regulations do little in this regard. Although the
regulations may limit the ability of pminers without sufficient net worth to
take advantage of such a stmcture, they generally would not prevent
taxpayers from receiving distributions of cash in redemption of a large
portion of their equity without the recognition of taxable gain.

4.

Instead, the proposed regulations would impose subjective- and in many
cases, noncommercial- requirements that must be satisfied for any
pminership liability to be treated as a recourse liability under section 752.
They would create an unadministrable regime and would shift allocations
of debt away from partners who bear economic risk for the debt to those
who do not. The regulations would fail to overmle the decision in Rap han
v. United States/ 8 in direct contravention of congressional intent, and they
would allow or require allocations of deductions to partners in direct
conflict with the fundamental principles of the section 704(b) regulations.
Accordingly, we recommend that the proposed regulations be withdrawn.
We suggest that any concerns with the current application of the
partnership disguised sale mles be addressed through targeted changes to
the section 707 regulations rather than the creation of an entirely new
regulatmy regime under section 752 that is applicable to every partnership
and partnership liability.

RECOURSE LIABILITIES- CURRENT RULES
1.

Since at least 1956, the themy underlying the regulations governing the
allocation of partnership liabilities has been that the liabilities should be
allocated to pminers who would be required to pay the liability if the
partnership was unable to do so because those partners are considered to
bear the economic burden for the liability. If a lender would have no
recourse to any partner if the palinership was unable to repay the liability,

17

Amy S. Elliot, "Treasury Officials Explain New Bottom-Dollar Guarantee Rules," Tax Notes,
Mar. 3, 2014, p. 904 (quoting Lisa Zarlenga, Treasury tax legislative counsel, as saying "When
we were considering changes in the section 752 mles related to [the debt-financed distribution]
exception, we determined that celiain principles that were being applied for just section 707
purposes ought to apply equally in non-disguised sale cases").
18

3 Cl. Ct. 457 (1983), rev'd on this issue, 759 F.2d 879 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
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only partnership profits could satisfy the liability. Accordingly, the
regulations have allocated partnership nonrecourse liabilities among the
partners in the same way the partnership's profits would be allocated
among them. 19
2.

C.

Consistent with that theory, as described in detail in Section 1.01 above,
under the cunent section 752 regulations, a partnership liability is
allocated to a partner as a partnership recourse liability to the extent that
the partner bears the economic risk of loss for the liability under a
relatively mechanical constmctive liquidation test.

PROPOSED PARTNERSHIP RECOURSE LIABILITY ALLOCATION
REGULATIONS
1.

The proposed regulations would generally make three critical changes to
the cunent section 752 regulations regarding partnership recourse
liabilities. First, they would impose recognition requirements that must be
satisfied for a partner or related person's payment obligation to be
recognized. Among these recognition requirements are provisions that
would prevent so-called bottom guarantees from increasing the
guaranteeing partner's share of liabilities. Second, the proposed
regulations would reduce the amount of any partner's or related person's
payment obligation for a partnership liability to the extent of any right of
reimbursement from any "person." Third, the proposed regulations would
apply the net value requirement, which is cunently applicable only to
disregarded entities, to all regarded entities. These proposed changes are
summarized below, followed by our analysis and commentaty.

2.

Recognition Requirements
a.

The preamble to the proposed regulations states that the Service
and Treasmy "are concerned that some partners or related persons
have entered into payment obligations that are not commercial
solely to achieve an allocation of a partnership liability to such
partner."20 It further states that the Service and Treasmy believe
that section 79 of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (DEFRA)which overmled the decision in Raphan21 (discussed below) and

19

See American Law Institute, "Federal Income Tax Project: Subchapter K, Proposals on
Taxation ofPattners," at 264 (1984).
20

Preamble to REG-119305-11, at 17.

21

3 Cl. Ct. 457. The Federal Circuit's reversal in Raphan, 759 F.2d 879, occuned after the
enactment ofDEFRA.
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directed Treasmy to prescribe regulations under section 7 52 on the
treatment of guarantees and other payment obligations -was
intended to ensure that bona fide, commercial payment obligations
would be given effect under section 752. 22 As a result, in contrast
to the cunent relatively mechanical and administrable partnership
recourse debt allocation rules, the proposed regulations would
impose recognition requirements - some of which are entirely
subjective- that must be satisfied for a partner's or related
person's payment obligation to be taken into account in
detennining whether a partner bears the economic risk of loss for a
partnership liability. The Service and Treasmy intend that the
satisfaction of those requirements will establish that the terms of a
payment obligation are "commercially reasonable and are not
designed solely to obtain tax benefits."23
b.

A payment obligation, other than one imposed by state law
(including the governing state partnership statute), must satisfy the
following seven requirements to be taken into account: 24
1.

11.

The obligor must maintain a commercially reasonable net
worth throughout the term of the payment obligation or be
subject to commercially reasonable contractual restrictions
on transfers of assets for inadequate consideration.
The obligor must be required to periodically provide
commercially reasonable documentation regarding the
obligor's financial condition.

111.

The term of the obligation must not end before that of the
partnership liability.

iv.

The payment obligation must not require that the primaty
or any other obligor on the partnership liability directly or
indirectly hold money or other liquid assets in an amount
that exceeds the reasonable needs of that obligor.

v.

The obligor must receive arm's-length consideration for
assuming the payment obligation.

22

Preamble to REG-119305-11, at 17-18.

23

Id. at 18.

24

Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(b)(3)(ii).
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3.

4.

v1.

In the case of a guarantee or similar anangement, the
obligor must be liable up to the full amount of its payment
obligation if, and to the extent that, any amount of the
partnership liability is not otherwise satisfied.

vn.

In the case of an indemnity, reimbursement, or similar
anangement, the obligor must be liable up to the full
amount of its obligation if, and to the extent that, any
amount of the indemnitee's or other beneficiaty's payment
obligation is satisfied.

Right of Reimbursement From Any Person
a.

The cunent partnership recourse liability regulations reduce the
amount of a partner's or related person's obligation to make a
payment for a partnership liability to the extent that the patiner or
related person is entitled to reimbursement from another partner or
a person related to another partner. 25

b.

The preamble states that the Service and Treasmy concluded that a
right to be reimbursed for a payment or contribution by an
unrelated person (for example, under an indemnification agreement
from a third party) should be taken into account in the same
manner.

c.

Accordingly, the proposed regulations provide that a partner's or
related person's payment obligation for a partnership liability is
reduced to the extent that the partner or related person is entitled to
reimbursement from any person. 26

Net Value Requirement Extended
a.

As noted above, the cunent patinership recourse liability
regulations generally presume that all partners and related persons
will satisfy their payment obligations unless the facts and
circumstances indicate a plan to circumvent or avoid the
obligation. This presumption does not apply to entities that are
disregarded as separate from their owners for federal income tax
purposes. Those entities are treated as bearing economic risk of
loss for a partnership liability only to the extent of their net value
as determined under Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(k).

25

Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-2(b)(5).

26

Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(b)(l).
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D.

b.

The proposed regulations would expand the application of the net
value requirement in reg. section 1.752-2(k) to all partners or
related persons (including grantor tmsts ), other than individuals
and decedents' estates.

c.

The expansion would apply to all payment obligations associated
with liabilities that are not trade payables. 27 Further, the proposed
regulations would require that an obligor subject to the net value
requirement timely give the partnership information about the
obligor's net value that is appropriately allocable to the
partnership's liabilities. 28

RECOURSE LIABILITIES- COMMENTARY
1.

DEFRA andRaphan
a.

As noted in the preamble to the proposed regulation, in DEFRA,
Congress directed Treasmy to issue regulations under section 752
that reject the holding in Raphan. However, as explained below,
the proposed regulations do not reject the holding in Raphan, but
adopt it. This raises a serious question about the validity of the
regulations. Moreover, the proposed regulations would allow- in
fact they would require - that many nomecourse liabilities
guaranteed by one or more partners be included in the tax basis of
the partnership interest of non-guaranteeing partners, creating the
same potential for abuse that Congress sought to preclude when it
directed Treasury to issue regulations rejecting the holding in
Raphan.

b.

The regulations issued in 1956 under section 752, which were in
effect during the tax year involved in Raphan, contained only a
few sentences conceming the sharing of partnership liabilities. 29
Those regulations generally provided that a partner's share of
partnership liabilities would be determined in accordance with the
partner's ratio for sharing losses under the partnership agreement.
However, a limited partner generally could be allocated a share of
liabilities only to the extent it had an obligation to make a future
capital contribution to the limited partnership. An exception
applied "where none of the partners have any personal liability

27

Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(b)(3)(iii)(B).

28

Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(b)(3)(iii)(C).

29

Treas. Reg.§ l-752-1(e), before removal by T.D. 8237 (Dec. 29, 1988).
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with respect to a partnership liability (as in the case of a mortgage
on real estate acquired by the partnership without the assumption
by the partnership or any of the pminers of any liability on the
m01tgage)."30 In that case all partners, including limited partners,
shared the liability in the same proportion as they shared profits.
c.

In Raphan, a limited partnership borrowed money on a
nonrecourse basis (that is, the terms of the debt limited the lender's
recourse to specified assets of the partnership). The general
partners, who were individuals, guaranteed the debt. The Claims
Comi held that the guarantee did not cause the general patiners to
be personally liable on the debt and that the limited partners could
therefore include a share of the debt in basis. In 1985 the Federal
Circuit reversed, but before it did, Congress addressed the issue in
DEFRA.

d.

Section 79 ofDEFRA, titled "Ovenuling of Raphan Case,"
provided as follows:
(a) GENERAL RULE.-Section 752 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 (and the regulations prescribed
thereunder) shall be applied without regard to the result
reached in the case ofRaphan vs the United States, 3 Cl.
Ct. 457 (1983).
(b) REGULATIONS.-In amending the regulations
prescribed under section 7 52 of such Code to reflect
subsection (a), the Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate
shall prescribe regulations relating to liabilities including
the treatment of guarantees, assumptions, indemnity
agreements and similar arrangements.

e.

The legislative history of the provision stated as follows:
Under the agreement, the decision in the Raphan case is not
to be followed for purposes of applying section 752 or the
regulations thereunder. ... [T]he conferees intend that the
revisions to the section 752 regulations will be based
largely on the manner in which the patiners, and persons
related to the partners, share the economic risk of loss with

30

Id
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respect to partnership debt (other than bona fide
nonrecourse debt, as defined by such regulations). 31
f.

Despite that clear directive from Congress, the proposed
regulations would not reject the holding of the Claims Court in
Raphan, but instead would adopt it. The Federal Circuit in Raphan
stated:
Examining the substance here establishes that the [general
partners] did not act at arm's length in guaranteeing the
construction loan. They did not charge [the partnership] for
the guarantee, as would an unrelated person, nor did [the
partnership] agree to pay [the general partners'] interest if
they were called upon to meet their guarantee. 32

g.

Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(b)(ii)(E) specifies that for a payment
obligation to be recognized, the partner or related person must
receive arm's-length consideration for assuming it. Because the
general partners in Raphan did not receive arm's-length
consideration for the guarantee, their payment obligation would be
disregarded under the proposed regulations. The debt would be
treated as nomecourse and includable in the basis of the limited
partners- exactly the result that Congress sought to negate in
DEFRA. As noted, this raises serious questions about the validity
of the proposed regulations.

h.

Beyond the validity issue, the proposed regulations allow the exact
abuse that Congress sought to negate in DEFRA: the inclusion of
liabilities in the basis of all partners, when only a subset bears the
economic risk of loss for the liability, and the concomitant ability
to traffic in noneconomic losses. As one commentator observed,
Treasury "feared a massive raid on the fisc following Raphan." 33
Post-DEFRA legislative enactments, such as the passive loss rules
of section 469, may help limit the damage to the fisc, but the
policy concerns that motivated Congress to ovenule Raphan in
DEFRA are still present today, and the proposed regulations fail to
address them.

31

H.R. Rep. No. 98-861, 869 (1984).

32

Raphan, 759 F2d, at 885.

33

William S. McKee et al., Federal Taxation ofPartnerships and Partners, at 8-4 (2007).
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2.

The Recognition Requirements
a.

According to the preamble, the satisfaction of the seven
recognition requirements listed in Prop. Treas. Reg.§ 1.7522(b)(3)(ii) is intended to establish that an obligation entered into by
a partner or related person regarding a partnership liability is
"commercial." As noted, the theory underlying the partnership
recourse liability allocation rules is that liabilities should be
allocated to partners that would be required to fund them if the
partnership were unable to do so. Whether or not an obligation
meets a "commercial" standard does not change the fact that a
partner with a legally enforceable payment obligation for a
partnership liability bears economic risk for that liability, and
under the theory described above, that economic risk should be
taken into account. As noted above, under the antiabuse rule in the
current regulations, an obligation would be disregarded in
circumstances that the Service and Treasury deem abusive.

b.

Moreover, unlike the existing objective and administrable section
752 regulations, recognition requirements 1, 2, 4, and 5 involve a
determination of the meaning of the terms "commercially
reasonable," "reasonable needs," or "arm's length." These
amorphous and subjective tests will require partners and
partnerships to make difficult, if not impossible, judgments in
order to determine whether a particular obligation can be taken into
account. Given the amorphous and subjective nature of these tests,
we expect that Service agents will challenge many payment
obligations on the grounds that the commercially reasonable,
reasonable needs, or arm's-length requirement is not met, if a
challenge would result in an increase in tax. We are particularly
surprised that the proposed regulations would require a subjective
analysis of an obligation for it to be taken into account, given the
public statements by the Service and Treasmy representatives
preceding the issuance of the proposed regulations that any new
rules concerning such a determination under section 752 would be
objective and mechanical. 34

34

See Elliott, "Guarantors May Need to Document Net Worth, Katz Says," Tax Notes, Sept. 30,
2013, p. 1528 ("Craig Gerson, attorney-advisor, Treasmy Office of Tax Legislative Counsel,
said the government is designing the test in the regs to be mechanical in nature," and Clifford
Warren, senior counsel for the Service's Office of Associate Chief Counsel (Passthroughs and
Special Industries), "added that the government is tlying to avoid using phrases like 'business
purpose' and 'commercially reasonable' in the guidance. 'We want it to be a more objective test,·
Footnote continued on next·page
80

c.

What does it mean to be required to maintain a commercially
reasonable net worth, to be subject to commercially reasonable
contractual restrictions on transfers without consideration, or, for a
primary obligor to hold money or other liquid assets in excess of
its reasonable needs? Those tenns will clearly have different
meanings depending on the obligor, borrower, partnership's
activities, and assets securing the loan. Similarly, what is arm'slength consideration for entering into a guarantee or other
obligation? In our experience, a partner is often willing to enter
into a guarantee of partnership debt because the partner will benefit
from the loan to the partnership and does not require additional
consideration. Does that mean that the arm's-length consideration
may be zero? Will taxpayers be forced to require lenders to
impose net worth documentation and maintenance requirements, or
partnerships to pay a guarantee fee, just to satisfy these
requirements even if they would not exist in an otherwise
commercial transaction? Even if taxpayers believe they can
establish that the commercially reasonable or arm's-length
requirement has been met, these subjective standards open the door
for challenges by the Service and will surely result in litigation.

d.

The third recognition requirement- that the term of the obligation
must not end before the term of the partnership liability- also does
not comport with the commercial reality in many situations. For
example, loans in the real estate development context are often
required to be fully guaranteed by a partner only until the property
reaches a specified level of stabilization (that is, a specified
occupancy or rental income level is reached). Further, if the
partnership sells the property that secures a partnership liability,
and the liability is assumed by the purchaser that guarantees it, a
partner-guarantor typically has the right to be released from the
guarantee. Even if the guarantor manages to satisfy the other five
recognition requirements are listed above, if a guarantee includes
these common commercial release terms, the proposed regulations
would require the guarantee to be disregarded and the partnership
debt treated as nonrecourse, even though the guarantor bears the
true economic risk for the debt.

e.

The sixth and seventh recognition requirements are extremely
broad and would prevent any obligation that is not a top guarantee

Footnote continued from previous page
to be frank. We don't want to be litigating about what's right and what's wrong in this area,' he
said.").

81

or similar aiTangement from being taken into account. The Service
has expressed concems about whether a bottom guarantee of the
last dollars of a liability should be taken into account as an
obligation, because that guarantee is of the least risky portion of
the liability, is not typically sought out by lenders and is entered
into solely for tax reasons. That is, it is non-commercial. Example
14 illustrates the application of this provision.
f.

35

Example 14
1.

A, B, and C are equal members of ABC LLC, which is
treated as a patinership for federal income tax purposes.
ABC botTows $1,000 from Bank. A guarantees payment of
up to $300 of the ABC liability if any portion of the $1,000
is not recovered by Banlc Accordingly, A's guarantee is a
top guarantee. B guarantees payment ofup to $200 of the
ABC liability, but only if Banlc otherwise recovers less than
$200. Accordingly, B's guarantee is a bottom guarantee.
A and B each waive rights of contribution against each
other, and each of their guarantees satisfies recognition
requirements 1 through 5 described above. Because A is
obligated to pay up to $300 if, and to the extent that, any
amount of the $1,000 partnership liability is not recovered
by Bank, A's guarantee satisfies the sixth recognition
requirement and is recognized as an obligation for purposes
of section 752. However, because B is obligated to pay up
to $200 only if, and to the extent that, Bank otherwise
recovers less than $200 ofthe $1,000 liability, B's
guarantee does not satisfy the sixth recognition requirement
and is disregarded. 35

n.

In fact, B' s guarantee would be disregarded under the
proposed regulations even if B guaranteed $999 of the
$1,000 liability. Does it make sense to treat a guarantor of
$999 of a $1,000 liability as bearing no economic risk of
loss for the liability while a guarantor of the top $200 of a
$1,000 liability is given full credit for the guarantee?
Moreover, there are circumstances under which a bottom
guarantee may expose the guarantor to more economic risk
than a full or top guarantee. For example, a top $200
guarantee of a $50,000 liability secured by an asset with a
$1 million value may be less likely to have to be satisfied

See Prop. Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-2(£), Example 10.
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than a bottom $200 guarantee of a $300 liability secured by
an asset with a $500 value. That Treasury and the Service
do not view the bottom guarantee as being "commercial"
does not change the fact that a bottom guarantor tmly may
bear greater economic risk for a partnership liability than a
top guarantor.
g.

The broad language in the sixth recognition requirement would
also cause a vertical slice guarantee to be disregarded (for
example, 50 percent of eve1y dollar of shortfall) because the
guarantor would not be liable for 100 percent of eve1y dollar of
shortfall. 36 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(b)(3)(ii)(F) further
provides that in determining whether an obligation satisfies the
sixth recognition requirement, the te1ms of a guarantee or similar
aiTangement will be treated as modified by any right of indemnity,
reimbursement, or similar aiTangement regardless of whether that
aiTangement would be recognized as an obligation for purposes of
section 752. That mle does not apply, however, to a right of
proportionate contribution mnning between pminers or related
persons that are co-obligors on a payment obligation for which
each is jointly and severally liable. Accordingly, under the
proposed regulations, if there is more than one obligor for a
pminership liability, even a top guarantee or similar obligation
would be disregarded unless the obligors are jointly and severally
liable. Similarly, a top guarantee must be disregarded if the
obligor has any right of indemnification from any person regarding
the guarantee. These points are illustrated in Example 2.

h.

Example 15
1.

The facts of Example 15 are the same as in Example 14,
except that C agrees to indemnify A up to the $50 that A
pays under its guarantee. Under the proposed regulations,
C's indemnity is treated as modifying A's guarantee such
that A is treated as liable for only $250 of A's $300
guarantee. Accordingly, because A is not liable up to the
full amount of the $300 guarantee if, and to the extent, any
amount of the partnership liability is not otherwise
satisfied, A's guarantee is completely disregarded? 7 This
is true even if C's indemnification obligation does not

36

See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(£), Example 12.

37

See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(£), Example 11.
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satisfy all the recognition requirements. Based on the
literal language ofProp. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(b)(3)(ii)(F),
it seems to be the case even if C's indemnity is a bottom
indemnity that applies only to the extent that A's payment
on the guarantee exceeds $250. Thus, a $250 top guarantee
would be respected, but a $300 top guarantee that is subject
to a $50 bottom indemnity would not be, even though the
latter anangement involves greater economic risk for the
guarantor.
1.

Contrary to the stated intention to recognize commercial
obligations for purposes of section 752, the proposed regulations
fail to respect guarantees that are entered into solely for nontax
reasons, even if they satisfy the other five recognition requirements
set forth above. For example, a lender may require that there be
multiple guarantors of a partnership liability on a joint, but not
several, basis. That common commercial obligation is disregarded
under the proposed regulations, which results in the debt being
treated as nonrecourse. Further, as illustrated in Example 3, it is
common in many purely commercial, non-tax-motivated
transactions for a majority partner that guarantees a partnership
liability to have a right of partial indemnification against specified
minority partners.

J.

Example 16
1.

A is the 90 percent managing member of ABC LLC, which
is in the trade or business of developing and renting office
buildings. B and C are key employees, and each owns a 5
percent membership interest. ABC LLC borrows $100
million from Bank under a constmction loan. For non-taxrelated reasons, Ban1c requires that A guarantee repayment
of the constmction loan. A agrees to guarantee the
constmction loan, if B and C each indemnify A for 5
percent of any payments that A is required to make under
the guarantee so that they bear an economic risk for the
constmction loan commensurate with their economic
interests in ABC LLC.

n.

Even though B 's and C 's agreement to indemnify A was
negotiated as part of a non-tax-related transaction, the
proposed regulations would cause the constmction loan to
be treated as a nonrecourse partnership liability.
Depending on the determination of the ABC LLC
members' shares of profits under Prop. Treas. Reg. §
1.752-3(a)(3), the allocation of the constmction loan among
A, B, and C may be very different from their shares of
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economic risk for the construction loan on account of the
guarantee and indemnity anangement.

k.

As noted above, the proposed regulations provide that the
recognition factors do not apply to payment obligations imposed
by state law, including the governing state partnership statute. As
shown in Examples 17 and 18, this may cause payment obligations
in economically identical situations to be treated differently.

1.

Example 17
i.

A is the general partner in the AB limited partnership,
which borrows $1,000 from Bank on a recourse basis.
Under state law, A is liable for the debts and obligations of
the AB limited partnership.

11.

Accordingly, under the proposed regulations, A's state law
payment obligation is respected regardless of whether it
satisfies any of the seven recognition requirements.
Example 18

m.

A is the managing member of AB LLC, which bmTows
$1,000 from Bank on a basis that is recourse to AB LLC
but not to any members. A, as the managing member,
guarantees the AB LLC debt.

1.

11.

n.

Even though A's economic risk is identical to its economic
risk in Example 4, A's payment obligation will not be taken
into account unless A satisfies all the recognition
requirements.

It is also unclear whether a DRO can ever be taken into account as
a payment obligation under the proposed regulations. Prop. Treas.
Reg. § 1.752-2(b)(3)(i) states that an obligation to make a payment
described under Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(b)(3)(i)(A) or (B) will
not be recognized unless the seven recognition requirements are
satisfied. Obligations described in Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7522(b)(3)(i)(B) include the obligation to make a capital contribution
and to restore a deficit capital account upon liquidation of the
partnership. Accordingly, a DRO must satisfy all seven
recognition requirements to be taken into account as a payment
obligation, which is unlikely. As illustrated in Example 19, this
will cause DROs to be disregarded for section 752 purposes.
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o.

Example 19
1.

Property 80

n.

38

As in Example 7 above, assume that X is a limited partner
in a limited partnership and is generally allocated 1 percent
of partnership profits and losses. The partnership's only
debt is a recourse debt of $100 from a third party. Assume
that X must maintain a share of the debt equal to at least
$10 to avoid receiving a deemed distribution under section
752(b) that will exceed X's basis in its partnership interest
and trigger gain under section 731(a). X enters into a DRO
for $10. Under the DRO, upon liquidation ofX's interest
in the partnership, X will be obligated to make a capital
contribution to the partnership equal to the lesser of $10 or
the amount ofX's deficit capital account. Assume further
that the partnership agreement meets the requirements of
the safe harbor of Treas. Reg. § 1. 704-1 (b)(2) and that in
lieu of the 1 percent allocation of losses to X, the
partnership agreement requires that X be allocated all
losses until X's capital account equals negative $10.
Finally, assume that the book balance sheet of the
patinership reflects the following:
100 Liability
( .20) X
(19.80) Other Partners

As described in Example 7 avove, under the current section
752 regulations, X's DRO should cause $10 of the debt to
be allocated to X. Upon a constructive liquidation of the
partnership, the property would have a zero value and the
partnership would be deemed to dispose of it for no
consideration, resulting in an $80 loss. Of this amount,
$9.80 would be allocated to X, and the balance would be
allocated to the other patiners. X would have a deficit
capital account of $10 and would be required to contribute
this amount to the partnership. As a result, X would bear
the economic risk of loss for $10 of the debt. 38

See Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(£), Example 2.
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39

111.

It is unlikely that X's DRO could satisfy all seven of the
recognition requirements. The DRO would become due
and payable upon liquidation ofX's interest in the
partnership. For a DRO to be effective, the section 704(b)
regulations require that it be satisfied by the later of the end
of the tax year in which the partner's interest in the
partnership is liquidated or within 90 days of that
liquidation. 39 As a result, X's obligation may end before
the termination of the partnership's liability, in violation of
the third recognition requirement. Also, it would be highly
unusual for X to be paid any consideration for entering into
a DRO, so the DRO may fail the fifth recognition
requirement.

iv.

It is also unclear whether the sixth recognition requirement
applies to a DRO or capital contribution obligation. If it
does, X's DRO would fail. As noted above, Prop. Treas.
Reg.§ 1.752-2(b)(3)(ii)(F) states that it applies to a
guarantee or similar anangement, while Prop. Treas. Reg. §
1.752-2(b)(3)(i) states that no payment obligation will be
recognized if it fails to satisfy the seven recognition
requirements. The reference to a guarantee or similar
arrangement as opposed to a payment obligation may
indicate that the sixth recognition requirement is intended
to apply to a nanower category of payment obligations. If
the sixth recognition requirement in the proposed
regulations applies to DROs, however, X's DRO would
presumably be disregarded. That is because if the
property's value was more than $70.20 but less than the full
$100 liability amount, on liquidation of the partnership, X
would be allocated less than $9.80 ofloss and would be
required to make a capital contribution of less than $10,
even if the partnership's assets were insufficient to satisfy
more than $10 of the partnership liability. Accordingly, X
would not be liable up to the full amount of its payment
obligation if, and to the extent that, any amount of the
partnership liability were not otherwise satisfied.

v.

DROs are commonly entered into to allow partners to be
allocated losses in compliance with the section 704(b)
regulations. Also, to the extent that a partnership

Treas. Reg.§ 1.704-1(b)(3).
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refmances a nomecourse loan encumbering contributed
property with a recourse loan or line of credit, the
contributing partner may enter into a DRO to prevent the
recognition of gain as a result of a reduction in the partner's
allocable share of partnership liabilities.
v1.

40

Real estate investment trust operating partnerships (REIT
OPs) often finance their activities through a recourse line of
credit rather than prope1iy-specific nomecourse debt. As a
result, many REIT OPs refinance nomecourse debt secured
by contributed properties in their recourse line of credit as
pati of their normal commercial operations. In those cases,
the contributing partner may enter into a DRO to ensure
that it can retain sufficient debt to avoid a deemed
distribution in excess of tax basis. The proposed
regulations would require REIT OPs to disregard such an
obligation.

p.

The proposed regulations further modify the existing antiabuse rule
in Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(j) to provide that an obligation will not be
taken into account if the facts and circumstances indicate that the
partnership liability is part of a plan or arrangement involving the
use of tiered partnerships, intermediaries, or similar arrangements
to convert a single liability into more than one liability, with a
principal pul]ose of circumventing the sixth recognition
requirement. 0 Example 20 explores the application of that rule.

q.

Example 20
1.

A, B, and C are equal members of ABC LLC, which is the
sole member of Property LLC, a disregarded entity that
owns property. Property LLC borrows $300 from Bank,
secured by a mortgage on the property. ABC LLC borrows
$700 from Bank, secured by its membership interest in
Property LLC (mezzanine financing). B enters into a full
guarantee of Property LLC's $300 mortgage debt, which
contains provisions that satisfy recognition requirements 1
through 5.

n.

B 's guarantee appears to satisfy the sixth recognition
requirement because B will be obligated to make a payment

Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(j)(4).
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on its guarantee to the extent that Property LLC's mortgage
debt is not fully satisfied.

3.

111.

However, because B's guarantee is ofthe mortgage debt,
which is senior in priority to the mezzanine financing, the
risk that B 's guarantee will be called is the same as the risk
ofB's bottom guarantee in Example 14, which was
disregarded under the sixth recognition requirement. Is this
arrangement subject to the modified antiabuse rule in Prop.
Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(j)(4)?41

1v.

Presumably, the modification to the antiabuse rule in Prop.
Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-2(j)(4) would cause a financing
transaction to be closely scrutinized that consists of both
fully guaranteed first mortgage debt and one or more tiers
of mezzanine or other subordinate debt because the
guarantee would be of the least risky portion of the
financing package. Mortgage and mezzanine financing
structures, which are common commercial aiTangements,
will be subject to scrutiny and potential challenge under the
proposed regulations to the extent that less than all the tiers
of mortgage and mezzanine financing are fully guaranteed.

Right of Reimbursement From Any Person
a.

As noted above, the proposed regulations reduce the amount of a
partner's or related person's payment obligation for a partnership
liability if that obligor has any right to reimbursement from any
person. 42 Apparently, this rule is intended to apply to
reimbursement rights from the debtor partnership. Although the

41

At a conference on February 24, 2014, Craig Gerson, attorney-advisor in the Office of Tax
Legislative Counsel, said that "tranched debt- the different components of it- are respected as
separate debt instruments . . . So if you guarantee only the senior debt in tranched debt and you
comply with all of the requirements of the regulation, that debt guarantee would be respected."
Gerson added, however, that the aiTangement would need to pass muster under general tax
principles and the reg. section 1.752-2 antiabuse rule. Elliot, supra note 3.
At a conference on March 31, 2014, Clifford WaiTen, special counsel to the Service associate
chief counsel (passthroughs and special industries), said, "If it's a true tiered loan and there
really is a first and second- it was not artificially contrived through some intermediary- I think
we would respect that." Asked whether the tranches could be issued by the same lender and still
be respected as separate, Warren responded "Yes, if it's real ... I'd probably know it ifi saw it."
Elliott, "Tranched Debt May be Respected Under New Bottom-Dollar Guarantee Rules," Tax
Notes, Apr. 7, 2014, p. 35.
42

Prop. Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-2(b)
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term "person" is not defined in the proposed regulations, the
general meaning of the te1m as set forth in section 7701(a)(l)
includes a partnership. In describing the current regulations, the
preamble states that "in detetmining the amount of any obligation
of a partner to make a payment to a creditor or a contribution to the
partnership with respect to a partnership liability, section 1. 7 522(b)(1) reduces the pminer's payment obligation by the amount of
any reimbursement that the partner would be entitled to receive
from another partner, a person related to another partner, or the
partnership" (emphasis added). Accordingly, the Service and
Treasury apparently believe that the current regulations reduce the
amount of a payment obligation on account of a right to be
reimbursed by the partnership. In fact, the preamble misstates
Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-2(b)(1), which only reduces the amount of an
obligor's payment obligation that is taken into account for
purposes of section 7 52 to the extent of any right of reimbursement
from another partner or a person related to another partner. The
current regulations do not reduce the amount of an obligor's
payment obligation as a result of a right to be reimbursed by the
partnership. This is consistent with the constructive liquidation
test ofTreas. Reg. § 1.752-2(b). Under the assumptions made in
that test, any right of reimbursement from the partnership would be
wmihless.
b.

A commercial, non-tax-motivated guarantee of a partnership
liability typically entitles the guarantor to step into the shoes of the
lender under a right of subrogation so that the guarantor is entitled
to pursue the partnership's assets. As noted above, however,
application of the current regulations' constructive liquidation test,
which would generally be retained in the proposed regulations,
requires that the partnership's assets be deemed worthless. If a
guarantor's subrogation rights against the pminership are taken
into account under the proposed regulations to reduce the amount
of a payment obligation for purposes of section 752, the
constructive liquidation test would effectively be ignored, and a
commercial guarantee with subrogation rights against the
partnership would never be taken into account as an obligation.

c.

As illustrated in Example 21, the reduction of a partner's or related
person's obligation on account of any reimbursement right from
any person, as opposed to a reimbursement right from another
partner or person related to another partner, arguably may negate
any payment obligation of an entity that is supported by a capital
contribution obligation from its owners.
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d.

Example 21
1.

11.

iii.

e.

A, B, and C are equal members of ABC LLC, which
bonows $1,000 from Bank. A, a corporation, guarantees
payment of up to $300 of the ABC liability if any amount
of the $1,000 is not recovered by Banlc (a top guarantee).
One of A's shareholders, individual X, agrees to make a
capital contribution to A to the extent that A becomes liable
to make a payment on its $300 top guarantee of ABC's
liability. X's agreement ensures that A is treated as having
sufficient net value to satisfy the expanded net value
requirement in the proposed regulations, discussed in detail
below.
Under the current regulations, A would be allocated $300
of the ABC liability on account of its guarantee.
However, when applying the proposed regulations to this
stmcture, even if A's guarantee satisfies all the recognition
requirements, it would be disregarded ifX's capital
contribution obligation is deemed to be a reimbursement
right from X. In that case, the $300 of ABC's liability
would be treated as a nonrecourse liability. Presumably,
this is not the intended result because it is inconsistent with
the purpose of the net value requirement, but it nevertheless
appears consistent with the language of the proposed
regulations.

We also note that the right to be reimbursed by a person other than
another partner or a person related to another partner does not
change the fact that a partner that undertakes a payment obligation
for a partnership liability bears more economic risk of loss than the
partners that have no payment obligation. For example, a
guarantor with a right of reimbursement from a third party bears
the risk of collection on the indemnity. Accordingly, if risk of loss
is the touchstone, it makes more sense to allocate the liability to
that partner than to treat the liability as a partnership nonrecourse
liability and allocate it to partners that bear no economic risk of
loss for the liability. Further, if a partner or related person
purchases insurance to cover its risk of having to make a payment
under a guarantee of a partnership liability, the insurance
represents an asset purchased by the partner-guarantor and should
not be viewed as a reduction in the guarantor's economic risk of
loss.

(
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4.

Interaction With Section 704(b)
a.

The section 704(b) regulations contain special rules for "pminer
nonrecourse debt," which are designed to require that losses
attributable to that debt be allocated to the partner that will bear
any economic burden corresponding to the allocation. The
proposed regulations would sub silentio dramatically alter the
partner nonrecourse debt rules in the section 704(b) regulations.
Moreover, as discussed below, that change is inconsistent with the
fundamental principles of section 704(b). Given the importance of
this interaction between the proposed and section 704(b)
regulations, it is surprising that the preamble to the proposed
regulations does not discuss it.

b.

Treas. Reg. § 1.704-2(b)(ii) provides:
(ii) Economic Effect.-(a) Fundamental principles.-In
order for an allocation to have economic effect, it must be
consistent with the underlying economic arrangement of
the partners. That means that in the event there is an
economic benefit or burden that corresponds to an
allocation, the partner to whom the allocation is made
must receive such economic benefit or bear such economic
burden. [Emphasis added.]

c.

43

One of the ways that the section 704(b) regulations effectuate this
fundamental principle is through a series of rules concerning
partner nonrecourse debt. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-2(b)(4) defmes
partner nonrecourse debt as "any partnership liability to the extent
the liability is nonrecourse for purposes [of] section 1.1001-2, and
a partner or related person (within the meaning of section 1.7524(b)) bears the economic risk ofloss under section 1.752-2
because, for example, the partner or related person is the creditor
or a guarantor." The section 704(b) regulations identify partner
nonrecourse deductions that are attributable to partner nonrecourse
debt and require those deductions to be allocated to the partner that
bears the economic risk of loss for the liability. 43 The concept is
that any economic burden corresponding to specified deductions
(typically, depreciation deductions) will be borne by the partner
that bears the economic risk of loss for the partner nonrecourse
debt (for example, a partner that has guaranteed an otherwise
nonrecourse debt). Accordingly, consistent with the fundamental

Treas. Reg. § 1.704-2(i).

92

principles articulated above, those partner nomecourse deductions
must be allocated to that partner. Example 22 illustrates these
provisions under cunent law.
d.

e.

Example 22
i.

A and B form AB partnership, each contributing $100,000.
The AB pminership borrows $800,000 on a nomecourse
basis, and A guarantees the debt. The partnership uses the
$1 million to purchase depreciable property for which
$100,000 of annual depreciation is allowable. The
depreciable property secures the debt, and no principal
payments on the debt are due for 10 years. The partnership
agreement provides that all items are to be allocated
equally to A and B.

11.

The $200,000 of depreciation deductions claimed in years 1
and 2 are, in effect, attributable to the capital of A and B
and may be allocated equally to them. If there were an
economic burden conesponding to the $200,000 of
depreciation deductions, the property would decline in
value to $800,000. If the property were sold for $800,000,
the proceeds would be sufficient only to repay the debt, and
A and B would receive nothing. Thus, A and B would each
bear $100,000 of the economic burden corresponding to the
depreciation deductions, and the equal allocation of those
depreciation deductions is valid.

111.

In year 3, however, the additional depreciation deductions
of $100,000 constitute partner nomecourse deductions that
must be allocated solely to A, notwithstanding the contrmy
provision in the partnership agreement. If there were an
economic burden corresponding to the additional $100,000
of depreciation deductions, the property would decline in
value to $700,000. If the property were sold for $700,000,
the proceeds would be insufficient to repay the $800,000
debt, and A would be required to pay $100,000 under its
guarantee. Thus, as a result of the guarantee, A would bear
the economic burden corresponding to the $100,000 of
depreciation deductions in year 3, and only A may be
allocated those deductions. A similar analysis would apply
for depreciation deductions in future years.

Because the proposed regulations would change the analysis
regarding the extent to which a partner bears the economic risk of
loss under Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-2, they would effectively change
the partner nomecourse debt rules of the section 704(b)
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regulations. Moreover, as illustrated by the following examples,
those changes are inconsistent with the fundamental principle of
section 704(b) that if there is an economic burden that conesponds
to an allocation of deductions, the partner to whom the allocation is
made must bear that economic burden.
f.

Example 23
i.

The facts are the same as in Example 22, except that the
proposed regulations apply, and A does not receive mm'slength consideration for providing the guarantee.
Altematively, any of the other recognition requirements of
Prop. Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-2(b)(3)(ii) are not present.
Because A does not bear the economic risk of loss for the
debt under the proposed regulations, the debt is not a
partner nomecourse debt within the meaning of Treas. Reg.
§ 1.704-2(b)(4), but a nomecourse liability within the
meaning ofTreas. Reg.§ 1.704-2(b)(3). Further, the year 3
depreciation deductions are not pminer nomecourse
deductions, but nomecourse deductions within the meaning
ofTreas. Reg. § 1.704-2(c). As a result, the year 3
depreciation deductions may be allocated equally between
A and B. Indeed, under these facts, it is unlikely that the
year 3 depreciation deductions could be allocated any other
way. 44

11.

Even though the proposed regulations do not treat A as
bearing the economic risk of loss for the liability, the
economic reality is the same as in Example 22. If there
were an economic burden conesponding to the $100,000 of
year 3 depreciation deductions, the property would decline
in value to $700,000. And if the property were then sold
for $700,000, the proceeds would be insufficient to repay
the $800,000 debt, and A would be required to pay
$100,000 under the guarantee. Thus, as a result of the
guarantee, A would bear the economic burden
conesponding to the $100,000 of additional depreciation
deductions in year 3. Nevertheless, the depreciation

44

See Treas. Reg.§ 1.704-2. The analysis assumes that the minimum gain charge-back
requirements ofTreas. Reg.§ 1.704-2 are met. Treas. Reg.§ 1.704-2(e)(2) generally requires
that nomecourse deductions be allocated in a manner that is reasonably consistent with
allocations that have substantial economic effect of some other significant partnership item
attributable to the property securing the nomecourse liability.
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deductions would be allocated equally between A and B, in
violation of the fundamental principles of section 704(b).
g.

Example 24
1.

11.

h.

45

Assume the same facts as in Example 22, except that A
guarantees only the bottom $500,000 of the $800,000
nonrecourse debt. Under the terms of the guarantee, A is
required to pay only if the creditor receives less than
$500,000 in proceeds after pursuing foreclosure or other
appropriate creditor remedies.
Under the cunent section 752 regulations, the $800,000
liability is bifurcated and treated as a $300,000 nonrecourse
liability and a $500,000 recourse liability for which A bears
the economic risk of loss. 45 Under the section 704(b)
regulations, the $100,000 of depreciation deductions in
each of years 3, 4 and 5 are nonrecourse deductions and
may be allocated equally to A and B. 46 However,
additional depreciation deductions in year 6 and thereafter
that reduce the basis of the property below the $500,000
guaranteed pmtion of the liability are partner nonrecourse
deductions and must be allocated solely to A. 47

iii.

This result is consistent with the stated fundamental
principles of section 704(b). If there were an economic
burden corresponding to the $100,000 of year 6
depreciation deductions, the property would decline in
value from $500,000 to $400,000. If the propeliy were
sold for $400,000, the proceeds would be insufficient to
repay the $800,000 debt, and A would be required to pay
$100,000 under the bottom guarantee.

lV.

Thus, as a result of the guarantee, A would bear the
economic burden conesponding to the $100,000 of
depreciation deductions in year 6, and only A may be
allocated those deductions.
Example 25

See Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(i); and Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2.

46

See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-2(d)(ii); and Treas. Reg.§ 1.704-2(m), Example 1(vii).
47 Id.
(
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1.

48

i.

The facts are the same as in Example 24, except that the
proposed regulations apply. A's bottom guarantee does not
meet the requirements of prop. reg. section 1.7522(b)(3)(ii)(F) and thus is not recognized. Because A does
not bear the economic risk of loss for the debt under the
proposed regulations, the debt is not a partner nonrecourse
debt within the meaning ofTreas. Reg. § 1.704-2(b)(4), but
a nonrecourse liability within the meaning ofTreas. Reg.§
1.704-2(b)(3). Further, the year 6 depreciation deductions
are not partner nonrecourse deductions, but nonrecourse
deductions within the meaning ofTreas. Reg. § 1.704-2(c).
As a result, the year 6 depreciation deductions may be
allocated equally between A and B. Indeed, under these
facts, it is unlikely that the year 6 depreciation deductions
could be allocated any other way. 48

n.

Even though the proposed regulations do not treat A as
bearing the economic risk of loss for the portion of the
liability subject to the bottom guarantee, the economic
reality is the same as in Example 11: If there were an
economic burden conesponding to the $100,000 of year 6
depreciation deductions, the property would decline in
value to $400,000. And if the property were then sold for
$400,000, the proceeds would be insufficient to repay the
$800,000 debt, and A would be required to pay $100,000
under the bottom guarantee. Thus, as a result of the bottom
guarantee, A would bear the economic burden
conesponding to the $100,000 of depreciation deductions
in year 6. Nevertheless, the depreciation deductions would
be allocated equally between A and B.
Thus, the proposed regulations would allow or even require
allocations that violate the fundamental principles of section
704(b). Moreover, they would allow or even require the very
abuse that the section 704(b) regulations are intended to precludenamely, allocations of tax losses to a partner that will not bear any
conesponding economic burden. As a result, the proposed
regulations will encourage abusive trafficking in noneconomic tax
losses.

See supra note 43.
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5.

Net Value Requirement Extended
a.

Under the current section 752 regulations, the determination of
whether a partner or related party has an obligation to make a
payment is based on the facts and circumstances at the time of the
detennination. 49 With the exception of disregarded entities, the
current regulations provide that all partners and related persons
that have payment obligations for a partnership liability are
presumed to satisfy their obligations that become due and payable
under the constructive liquidation test irrespective of their actual
net worth unless the facts and circumstances indicate a plan to
circumvent or avoid the obligation. 50 This presumption limits the
extent to which a partnership is required to evaluate a partner's
current or future ability to satisfy a payment obligation in
determining how liabilities should be allocated, except in
potentially abusive circumstances.

b.

Notwithstanding that presumption, the current regulations contain
an antiabuse rule under which a partner's or related person's
obligation to make a payment may be disregarded or treated as an
obligation of another person for purposes of section 752. The
antiabuse rule may apply if the facts and circumstances indicate
that a principal purpose of the arrangement between the parties is
to eliminate the partner's economic risk of loss for that obligation,
or create the appearance of a partner or related person bearing the
economic risk of loss when, in fact, the substance of the
arrangement is otherwise. 5 1 Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(j) contains an
example of a plan to circumvent or avoid an obligation, involving a
thinly capitalized corporate partner that is a member of a
consolidated return group and enters into a DRO to allow the
group to enjoy tax losses while at the same time limiting its
monetary exposure for those losses. The example concludes that
the rules of section 752 must be applied as if the DRO did not
exist.

c.

As noted above, Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(k) does impose a net worth
requirement for a payment obligation of a disregarded entity. 52
The regulations generally provide that such an obligation is taken

49

Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(b)(3).

50

Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-2(b)(6).

51

Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(j).

52

Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(k).
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into account only to the extent of the net value of the disregarded
entity, which is measured on specified dates. Because the existence
of a legal entity that is disregarded as separate from its owner
limits the owner's liability for state law purposes, this rule is
consistent with the underlying premise of the section 752
regulations that a taxpayer should be treated as bearing the
economic risk of loss for a partnership liability to the extent that it
could be required to make a payment in the event that the
partnership's assets become worthless.

53

d.

The proposed regulations expand the Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-2(k) net
value requirement to apply to any partner, other than an individual
or decedent's estate, that enters into an obligation for a partnership
liability (other than a trade payable). Accordingly, to the extent
that an obligation is taken into account after the application of the
recognition requirements described above, the allocation of a
partnership liability on account of the obligation entered into by
the partner or related person will be limited to that obligor's net
value. Also, the proposed regulations require that an obligor
subject to the net value requirement timely give the partnership
information about the obligor's net value that is appropriately
allocable to the partnership's liabilities.

e.

We believe it is unnecessa1y to expand the net value requirement
to every regarded entity obligor. A regarded business entity that
enters into a payment obligation for a partnership liability is fully
exposed to the extent of the entity's assets. Treasmy and the
Service have not suggested that they are aware of taxpayers
circumventing the current rules by structuring limited value entities
that enter into payment obligations. In the only litigated case we
know of involving a guarantee by an entity with limited value, the
Service successfully argued that the guarantee should be
disregarded under the existing antiabuse rule ofTreas. Reg.§
1.752-2(j). 53 The expansion of that rule and the resulting
information sharing and collection requirements will significantly
increase the administrative burden on partners and partnerships in
circumstances in which the requirements are unnecessary.
Moreover, the extent of the information that must be provided to
the partnership to establish an obligor's net value that is allocable
to a partnership liability is unclear. Is a third-party appraisal
required? Is an internal valuation sufficient? Will it suffice to

Canal Corp. v. Commissioner, 135 T.C. 199 (2010).
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simply provide a statement to the partnership that the obligor has
net worth that is at least equal to its payment obligation?
f.

6.

The preamble to the proposed regulations states that Treasmy and
the Service decided not to extend the net worth requirement to
individuals because ofthe nature of personal guarantees. 54
Presumably, they were concerned that extending the net worth
requirement to individuals would be burdensome and intmsive.
We agree with that conclusion. We would note, however, that
although individuals will not need to provide financial infmmation
to their partnerships under the net value requirement, they are
subject to all the recognition requirements of Prop. Treas. Reg. §
1.752-2(b)(3) discussed above. Accordingly, individuals will need
to provide financial information to lenders or their partnerships, or
be subject to restrictions on dispositions of assets, in circumstances
in which the lender or partnership may not have otherwise required
the delivery of such infmmation. Further, if a regarded business
entity owned by an individual enters into an obligation for a
patinership liability that is supported by a capital contribution
obligation of the individual, the entity may be required to deliver
financial information about the individual owner of the entity in
order to prove its net value that is allocable to the partnership
liability.

Effective Date and Transition Rule
a.

The changes to the partnership recourse liability mles will apply
prospectively for liabilities incurred or assumed by a partnership,
and for payment obligations imposed or undertaken, on or after the
date the final regulations are published with the exception of
liabilities incurred or assumed and payment obligations imposed or
undertaken pursuant to a written binding contract. 55 Thus, in
general, it appears that the proposed regulations would apply to
any liability incurred after the effective date, even if that liability
refinances a pre-effective-date liability that was subject to a
guarantee.

b.

It is unclear how the prospective effective date would apply to a
guarantee or other payment obligation for a term of years entered
into before the date the final regulations are published that contains

54

Preamble to REG-119305-11, at 21.

55

Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(1)(1).
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an elective or automatic extension, subject to the right to terminate
the obligation with sufficient notice and satisfaction of specified
terms. Arguably, if those provisions are in a written binding
contract, an extended payment obligation should continue to be
subject to the existing section 752 regulations. Accordingly,
although the precise scope of this rule is unclear, it may allow
some existing guarantees for a term of years that may be extended
under debt maintenance agreements to be grandfathered if they are
not altered after the date the final regulations are published.
However, if a guarantee is amended on or after that date, the
guarantee would likely be treated as a new obligation subject to the
new section 752 regulations. The application of the effective date
rules is explored in the following examples.
c.

Example 26
1.

Before the effective date of the proposed regulations, a
partnership enters into a nonrecourse loan from Bank X
with a 10-year term. To maintain A's allocable share of the
liability to avoid gain recognition as a result of a deemed
distribution under section 752(b) in excess of A's basis in
the partnership interest, A enters into a full guarantee of the
liability.

11.

A's guarantee provides that it has an initial term of three
years and is thereafter automatically extended for
successive one-year terms unless A provides six-months
prior written notice to Bank X, and the partnership satisfies
specified financial requirements. Assume the proposed
regulations become effective on the second anniversary of
the partnership incurring the Banlc X debt. Presumably,
A's guarantee would be grandfathered for the balance of
the initial term because the liability was incurred, and A's
payment obligation was imposed or undertaken, pursuant to
a written binding contract entered into before the date the
proposed regulations became effective.

111.

d.

Would the automatic one-year extensions of A's guarantee
also be grandfathered? Arguably, they should be because
they were imposed or undertaken pursuant to a written
binding contract entered into before the effective date of
the proposed regulations.
Example 27

1.

The facts are the same as in Example 26, except that the
partnership and A also enter into a debt maintenance
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agreement that obligates the partnership to maintain a
specified level of debt that must be guaranteed by A for a
10-year period. A's guarantee of the Bank X liability is for
the fulllO-year te1m. Assume the proposed regulations
become effective on the second anniversmy of the
partnership incurring the Banlc X liability. On the third
anniversmy, the partnership refinances the Banlc X liability
with a loan from Bank Y. Under the debt maintenance
agreement, A is required to enter into a guarantee of the
Bank Y liability.
11.

e.

Example 28
1.

f.

Is A's guarantee of the Bank Y liability grandfathered
under the current section 752 regulations because both the
Banlc Y liability and the guarantee were undertaken
pursuant to the debt maintenance agreement, which is a
written binding contract entered into before the date the
proposed regulations became effective?

The facts are the same as in Example 27, except that A has
the right, but not the obligation, to guarantee the
partnership's debt for a 10-year period under the debt
maintenance agreement. If A enters into a guarantee of the
Bank Y liability one year after the proposed regulations
become effective, is A grandfathered under the existing
section 752 regulations because the guarantee was
undertaken pursuant to a written binding contract entered
into before the date the proposed regulations became
effective?

To ease their potential effect when they become effective, the
proposed regulations provide for a seven-year transition period.
During that period, if a partner (the transition partner) has a share
of recourse liabilities under existing Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-2(b), the
partnership may choose not to apply the new partnership recourse
debt allocation mles to an amount of partnership liabilities equal to
the excess of the transition partner's share of recourse liabilities
over its adjusted basis in the partnership interest. The amount of
partnership liabilities to which the transition mle applies is reduced
to the extent that the built-in gain attributable to the transition
partner's negative tax basis capital account is recognized. Further,
if the transition partner is a partnership, S corporation, or
disregarded entity, a 50 percent or greater change in ownership of
the transition partner will terminate the transition period. Because
the seven-year transition mle applies only if elected by the
partnership, partners that have entered into or will enter into
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guarantees and similar obligations for partnership liabilities should
take steps now to require that the partnership make that election if
the proposed regulations become effective, and the partner so
requests. As illustrated in Example 16, some taxpayers may find
that the seven-year transition period is not long enough.
g.

Example 28
1.

Before the effective date of the proposed regulations, A
contributed property to a partnership subject to debt in
excess ofbasis. To obtain an enhanced share of partnership
liabilities and avoid gain recognition as a result of a
deemed distribution under section 752(b) in excess of A's
basis in the partnership interest, A enters into a guarantee
or DRO. The partnership and A also enter into a lockout
agreement that generally provides that the partnership will
not sell the contributed property (which would trigger A's
gain under section 704(c)) for a specified period. Also, to
further protect A's tax deferral, the lockout agreement
contains debt maintenance provisions that obligate the
pminership during the same period to maintain a specified
level of debt that may be guaranteed by A.

ii.

As discussed above, it is unclear whether that arrangement
would be grandfathered under the binding contract
exception of Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(1)(1). If the
specified period extends beyond the seven-year transition
period, A will be denied the benefit of its bargain because
of a change in the regulations that is not truly prospective
only. We are familiar with many real-world cases in which
the specified period exceeds seven years, including those in
which A is an individual, and the period ends only on A's
death (at which time the tax liability is absolved by viltue
of the step-up in basis at death).

h.

Other taxpayers may fmd that the seven-year transition rule is
inadequate because it limits relief to an amount equal to the excess
of the taxpayer's share of recourse liabilities over basis in the
partnership interest immediately before the proposed regulations
become effective.

1.

Example 29
1.

The facts are the same as in Example 28, except that the
contributed property is depreciable, and A enters into the
guarantee not because A needs an enhanced share of the
liabilities at the time of contribution, but because A
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anticipates needing an enhanced share in the future. This
often occurs with contributions of depreciable property
subject to nonrecourse debt because of the phenomenon
known as "section 704(c) bum-off." Section 704(c) bumoff refers to the fact that the amount of section 704(c) gain
on depreciable property contributed to a partnership
declines annually as depreciation deductions are claimed. 56
ii.

As discussed above, as the section 704( c) gain declines
annually, so does the amount of nonrecourse debt allocated
to the contributing partner under the second tier of Treas.
Reg.§ 1-752-3(a)(2).

iii.

In the context of the seven-year transition rule, the point is
that if A has a sufficient share of nonrecourse liabilities to
avoid gain recognition immediately before the effective
date of the proposed regulations but, nevertheless, has
guaranteed debt to prevent gain recognition in the future
from an anticipated reduction of nonrecourse liabilities,
seven-year transition relief will be unavailable for the
guaranteed liability. 57

J.

Still other taxpayers may find that the rule terminating seven-year
transition relief when there is a change in ownership to a transition
partner that is a partnership causes them to lose relief as a result of
events they cannot control.

k.

Example 30
i.

A is a 49 percent partner, and B is a 51 percent partner, in
an upper-tier partnership (UTP). UTP is a 30 percent
partner in a lower-tier partnership (LTP). To maintain an
enhanced share of L TP liabilities, UTP has entered into a
guarantee of specified LTP liabilities. Further, A and B

56

Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(a)(3)(9)(ii). See generally Blake D. Rubin and Andrea M. Whiteway,
"Making Section 704(c) Sing for You," 66 NY. U Federal Tax Institute ch. 9 (2008).
57

To illustrate, immediately before the effective date of the proposed regulations, A might have
a negative $100 tax basis capital account, $100 share of nonrecourse liabilities, and $20 share of
recourse liabilities on account of a guarantee entered into to prevent future gain recognition, as
A's section 704(c) gain bums off and A's share of nonrecourse liabilities declines. A's tax basis
in the interest would be $20, and the seven-year transition rule would be inapplicable because
A's $20 share of recourse liabilities does not exceed the basis in its interest. Relief might be
available initially under the general effective date rule of Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(1)(1) but
would be lost if the debt subject to the guarantee were refinanced.
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have entered into a capital contribution obligation requiring
that ifUTP must pay on its guarantee, A will contribute 49
percent, and B will contribute 51 percent of the required
funds to UTP. B sells its interest to C, which also assumes
B's capital contribution obligation.
n.

E.

Under Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(l)(B)(ii), A loses the
benefit of the seven-year transition rule and recognizes gain
on account of a deemed distribution under section 7 52(b)
that exceeds the basis in A's interest. 58 Thus, A loses the
benefit of the seven-year transition rule even though its
payment obligation is unchanged, there is no change in the
partnership liability, and it has no control over B 's sale.
The policy justification for this seems particularly opaque,
even under a set of proposed regulations whose policy
justification is obscure at best.

NONRECOURSE LIABILITIES - CURRENT RULES
1.

As discussed above, a partnership liability is a nonrecourse liability if no
patiner or related person bears the economic risk of loss for that liability.
Under Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-3(a), a partner's share of partnership
nonrecourse liabilities equals the sum of three tiers of allocations. First, a
patiner is allocated an amount of a partnership's nonrecourse liabilities
equal to the amount of that partner's share of partnership minimum gain
determined under section 704(b). 59 The partnership minimum gain is
generally the excess of the amount of a nonrecourse liability over the
section 704(b) book value of the property securing the liability.

2.

Second, a partner is allocated an amount of a partnership's nonrecourse
liabilities equal to the amount of any taxable gain that would be allocated
to the pa1iner under section 704(c) (or in the same manner as under section
704(c) if partnership property is revalued), if the partnership disposed of
all patinership property subject to nonrecourse liabilities for no

58

Even if the anangement might otherwise be grandfathered under the general effective date rule
of Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(1)(1), it appears that that status would be lost as a result of the
technical termination ofUTP that would occur under section 708(b)(l)(B). New UTP would not
have incuned any liability or payment obligation prior to the effective date. The relief for
technical terminations provided by the general effective date rule of Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7522(1)(2)(B) applies only for purposes of the seven-year transition rule.
59

Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-3(a)(l).
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consideration other than full satisfaction of the liabilities. 60 The second
tier amount is often referred to as "section 704(c) minimum gain."

F.

3.

Finally, a partner's share of the amount of nonrecourse liabilities that is
not allocated to partners under the first or second tiers (excess nonrecourse
liabilities) is determined in accordance with the partner's share of
partnership profits. The partner's interest in partnership profits is
determined by taking into account all facts and circumstances regarding
the partners' economic arrangement. 61

4.

The current regulations provide that the partnership agreement may
specify the partner's interest in partnership profits for purposes of
allocating excess nonrecourse liabilities so long as the specified interest is
reasonably consistent with allocations (that have substantial economic
effect under the section 704(b) regulations) of some significant item of
partnership income or gain (significant item method). Alternatively, the
current regulations provide that excess nonrecourse liabilities may be
allocated among the partners in accordance with the manner in which it is
reasonably expected that the deductions attributable to those nonrecourse
liabilities will be allocated (alternative method). Also, the partnership
may first allocate excess nonrecourse liabilities to a partner up to the
amount ofbuilt-in gain that is allocable to the partner on section 704(c)
property or property for which reverse section 704(c) allocations are
applicable by virtue of a book-up (as described in Treas. Reg. § 1.7043(a)(6)(i)) where such property is subject to the nonrecourse liability to the
extent that such built-in gain exceeds the amount of gain taken into
account under the second tier for that property (excess section 704(c)
method). 62

PROPOSED NONRECOURSE LIABILITY REGULATIONS
1.

60

While the proposed regulations retain the excess section 704(c) method for
allocating excess nonrecourse liabilities, the significant item and
alternative methods would both be eliminated. Instead, the proposed
regulations would allow a partnership to allocate excess nonrecourse
liabilities based on the partners' liquidation value percentages. 63 A
partner's liquidation value percentage is the ratio (expressed as a
percentage) of the liquidation value of the partner's interest in the

Treas. Reg. § 1.752-3(a)(2).

61

Treas. Reg. § 1.752-3(a)(3).
62 Id.
63

Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-3(a)(3).

105

partnership to the aggregate liquidation value of all the partners' interests
in the partnership. A partner's liquidation value percentage must be
determined upon fmmation of the partnership and is required to be
redete1mined whenever a revaluation event occurs, as set fmth in Treas.
Reg.§ 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(f)(5) (such as a dispropmtionate capital
contribution or distribution), regardless of whether the partnership
revalues its assets. The liquidation value of a partner's interest in a
partnership is the amount of cash the partner would receive with respect to
the interest if, immediately after the formation of the partnership or the
occunence of a section 704(b) revaluation event, the partnership sold all
its assets for a cash amount equal to the fair market value of those assets
(taking into account section 7701(g)); satisfied all its liabilities (other than
those described in Treas. Reg. § 1.752-7); paid an unrelated third patty to
assume all of its Treas. Reg. § 1. 7 52-7 liabilities in a fully taxable
transaction; and then liquidated. 64 A pmtner's liquidation value
percentage is thus equal to the partner's interest in partnership capital. 65
2.

G.

Like the proposed regulations on partnership recourse liabilities, the
proposed changes to the pmtnership nonrecourse liability regulations
would apply to liabilities incurred or assumed by a pa1tnership on or after
the date the proposed regulations are published as fmal regulations.

NONRECOURSE LIABILITIES- COMMENTARY
1.

The preamble states that the Service and Treasury believe that the
significant item and alternative methods may not properly reflect a
partner's share of partnership profits that are generally used to repay
nonrecourse liabilities because the allocation of the significant item may
not necessarily reflect the overall economic anangement of the pmtners.
If the interest in partnership profits is to be the touchstone for allocating
nonrecourse liabilities (as it has been since 1956), it seems that allocating
partnership nonrecourse liabilities in accordance with the partners'
liquidation value percentages fails to reflect that approach. Except for a
simple pmtnership in which each partner's share of profits and losses
conesponds to that partner's percentage share of capital contributions, the
partners' liquidation value percentages will not conespond to their share
of profits or losses. Consequently, valid allocations of losses to partners
under the section 704(b) regulations may be subject to the section 704(d)
basis limitation, as shown in Example 19.

64

!d. The liquidation value used to determine a partner's liquidation value percentage is similar
to that for the determination of the liquidation value of a profits interest pa1tner under Rev. Proc.
93-27, 1993-2 C.B. 343.
65

See Rev. Proc. 93-27; and Treas. Reg.§ 1.704-1(e)(1)(v).
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2.

Example 31
a.

A and Beach make $1,000 capital contributions to AB Partnership,
and each has a 50 percent share of AB Partnership's profits, losses
and distributions. AB Partnership borrows $9,000 from Bank on a
nonrecourse basis and acquires property with a value of$11,000.
Following the formation of the AB Partnership and at a time when
the value of the partnership's property is still $11,000, Cis
admitted to the AB Partnership for a profits interest in exchange
for services provided by C to or for the benefit of the AB
Partnership. The Erofits interest complies with the safe harbor in
Rev. Proc. 93-27. 6 The AB Partnership agreement is amended to
provide that operating distributions will be made first to A and B
until they have received an 8 percent cumulative compounded
retum on each of their unretumed capital contributions, and
thereafter 33 percent to each of A, B, and C. Distributions from
capital events will be made first to A and B pro rata until their
unretumed capital contributions are reduced to zero; second to A
and B until they have received an 8 percent cumulative
compounded retum on each of their unretumed capital
contributions; and thereafter 33 percent to each of A, B, and C.
Upon liquidation of the AB Partnership, distributions to the
partners are to be made in accordance with partners' positive
capital accounts. C enters into a DRO so it may be allocated a 33
percent share of losses in accordance with the section 704(b)
regulations. 67

b.

Taking into account A's and B's right to a preferred retum on their
unretumed capital contributions, it is unclear what C's share of the
AB Partnership's profits is when allocating the partnership's
nonrecourse liabilities under Treas. Reg. § 1.752-3(a)(3) according
to the general facts and circumstances test. Under the existing
regulations, the AB Partnership could apply the significant item
method and allocate 33 percent of the $9,000 liability to C based
on the residual distribution of the AB Partnership's profits in
accordance with the partners' percentage interests, which would
increase C's basis to $3,000 under section 752(a). As a result, C
would be able to deduct losses allocated to it under the section
704(b) regulations and would not be prohibited from deducting
those losses under section 704( d). However, in applying the

66

1993-2 C.B. 343.

67

Treas. Reg.§ 1.704-l(b)(2)(ii)(b)(3).
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liquidation value percentage method in the proposed regulations,
because C's liquidation value percentage would be zero, C would
not be allocated any of the $9,000 liability. Accordingly, under the
liquidation value percentage safe harbor, until a revaluation event
occurs, and C's liquidation value percentage is recomputed, C
would be unable to deduct any losses validly allocated to it under
the section 704(b) regulations because it would be subject to the
section 704(d) basis limitation.

68

3.

Similarly, partnership nomecourse deductions may be validly allocated
among partners in a manner that is inconsistent with the partners'
liquidation value percentages under section 704(b). The inability to
allocate nomecourse debt under the altemative method will result in
unnecessary shifts in the allocation of nomecourse debt among partners.
This is because the nomecourse debt allocated under Treas. Reg.§ 1.7523(a)(3) in accordance with the partners' liquidation value percentages
becomes subject to Treas. Reg. § 1.752-3(a)(l) and is allocated in
accordance with the partners' shares of partnership minimum gain.
Among other things, that shift in a partner's share ofnomecourse debt
may have adverse consequences under section 7 51 (b). 68

4.

The proposed regulations also would impose an additional burden on
partnerships: They must revalue their assets to determine the partners'
liquidation value percentages even if the partnership would not otherwise
elect to revalue its assets.

5.

Fundamentally, the proposed regulations would limit flexibility in the
allocation of excess nomecourse liabilities based on an unpersuasive
rationale. The cmrent section 752 regulations intentionally allocate or
allow for the allocation of partnership nomecourse debt to partners to
prevent the recognition of built-in gain by partners and allow them to
recognize losses allocated under section 704(b). 69 The statement in the

See Rev. Rul. 84-102, 1984-2 C.B. 119.

69

The current regulations generally ensure that upon a contribution of property to a partnership,
the contributing partner is allocated an amount ofnomecourse debt under Treas. Reg.§ 1.7523(a)(2) that is at least equal to the amount ofnomecourse debt in excess of the partner's tax basis
in the contributed property. After their initial issuance, the regulations were amended to further
minimize the likelihood of a deemed distribution under section 752(b) in excess of a partner's
basis in a partnership. The regulations were modified in 2000 to give a partnership the flexibility
to allocate debt secured by multiple properties among those properties in a manner that
maximizes the allocation of that nomecourse debt back to the contributing partner. See T.D.
8906. Also, as noted above, the regulations were amended to allow a partnership to allocate
excess nomecourse debt under the excess section 704(c) method to the extent of any section
704(c) gain unaccounted for under Treas. Reg.§ 1.752-3(a)(2). Id
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preamble that the Service and Treasury believe that the significant item
and alternative methods "may not properly reflect a partner's share of
partnership profits" seems particularly unconvincing given that the
liquidation value percentage safe harbor in the proposed regulations does
not reflect the partner's interest in profits at all, but reflects the partner's
interest in capital.
6.

H.

70

One of the primaty motivations for changing the way in which partnership
excess nomecourse liabilities are allocated under Prop. Treas. Reg. §
1.752-3(a)(3) may have been to limit the ability to stmcture a leveraged
partnership transaction with nomecourse debt when the significant item
method is used to allocate the entire amount allocable under that section to
the distributee-partner in accordance with a preferred return allocation.
The Service has attacked that stmcture in LTR 200436001 and ILM
200513022. If the goal was to prevent that stmcture, it could be achieved
by simply changing the manner in which the allocation of partnership
nomecourse debt is taken into account for purposes of the debt-financed
distribution exception to the disguised sale mles. That approach was
already taken to exclude allocations of partnership debt under Treas. Reg.
§ 1.752-3(a)(l) or (2) or the excess section 704(c) method from being
taken into account for purposes of the debt-financed distribution
exception. 70 The approach would specifically target the Service's and
Treasury's concerns while preserving the intended flexibility in the
allocation of partnership nomecourse debt.

CONCLUSION
1.

If finalized, the amendments to the partnership debt allocation mles in the
proposed regulations would be among the most significant changes in
partnership tax law in more than 20 years. In many cases, they would
result in the recognition of taxable gain by partners or limit partners'
ability to take losses into account as a result of a reduction in their
allocable share of partnership liabilities.

2.

In contrast to the existing regulations on the allocation of partnership
recourse liabilities, which are largely mechanical and administrable, the
proposed regulations would impose unclear, subjective, and in some cases,
noncommercial requirements on payment obligations commonly entered
into by partners in order for those obligations to be taken into account
under section 752. The proposed regulations are inconsistent with both
Congress's directive as stated in the legislative history ofDEFRA and the
stmcture and policy of the section 704(b) regulations. Moreover, the

Treas. Reg. § 1.707-5(a)(2)(ii); Treas. Reg. § 1.752-3(a)(3).
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proposed regulations on nonrecourse liabilities unnecessarily limit the
intended flexibility of the cutTent regulations.
3.

The American Law Institute, in its 1984 detailed analysis and proposals
conceming subchapter K, noted that "once it is decided to apply relatively
strict rules to profit-and-loss allocations ... there seem to be no important
policies served by a strict rule for allocating liabilities among partners in
computing their basis for their patinership interests. This is particularly
true when there appears to be more than one justifiable allocation with no
single one being clearly cotTect."71 The section 704(b) regulations provide
strict rules for allocating profits and losses, and the proposed regulations
serve no impmiant policy apart from their indirect attack on leveraged
partnerships.

4.

We suggest that the proposed regulations under section 752 be withdrawn.
If the Service and Treasury believe changes to the patinership debt
allocation rules are necessmy to target specific concems with partnership
disguised sale structures, the agencies should propose changes in the
section 707 regulations rather than imposing an unworkable regime on
every partnership and pminership liability.
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ALI report, supra note 5, at 270.
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